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I. INTRODUCTION
After a traffic stop for a minor violation, a young woman was asked
if she had any "knives, guns, dead bodies, grenades, rocket launchers or
anything that shouldn't be in the vehicle." She responded that she did
not. The officer then intimated that she would surely agree to a search
of her vehicle because she had nothing to hide. In another case, a man
was stopped for having no rear-registration light on his vehicle
whereupon the officer called to the scene a second officer with a canine,
which was trained to identify the presence of contraband. In yet another
case, an individual was stopped for speeding. This individual informed
the officer that he was moving from another jurisdiction to seek
employment; however, the officer noticed no baggage or the like in the
vehicle and, consequently, called in a canine to check for contraband.
Does inquiring about rocket launchers or bringing canines into a routine
traffic stop sound like the actions of the authorities in Baghdad? Well,
maybe, but these were the actions of the police somewhere in the state
of Illinois.'
1. See, e.g., People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203-04 (Il. 2003) (canine sniff of vehicle
after traffic stop for speeding), vacated sub nom. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005);
[Vol. 36
Curbing Aggressive Police Tactics
In the past thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has shown
extraordinary tolerance of a wide variety of police conduct during
routine traffic stops and has regularly rejected arguments that the
procedures violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures . In a stunning series of cases,
however, the Supreme Court of Illinois has quickly interceded and re-
examined the law of traffic stops, effectively abolishing a number of
investigative techniques used by police.3 Although the United States
Supreme Court recently entered the fray by reversing one of these
decisions,4 the impact of the High Court's action may be lessened
somewhat by the Supreme Court of Illinois' rigorous approach to
analyzing police conduct during routine traffic stops. This Article will
demonstrate that many types of coercive investigative techniques that
have been given a pass by the United States Supreme Court are now
difficult-if not impossible-to justify under Illinois law.
Part II of this Article will provide background information on the
United States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment case law and will
show the Court's lack of oversight of police conduct regarding traffic
stops. 5  Part III will summarize the Illinois cases that have affected
police conduct during traffic stops, 6 and Part IV will analyze the rules
that have emerged from these cases and the lower court decisions that
have followed Part V will discuss approaches that other jurisdictions
have taken in this context, employing a reasonable suspicion standard
People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ill. 2002) (canine sniff of vehicle after a traffic stop for
burned out registration light), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 937 (2003); People v. Goeking, 780 N.E.2d
829, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (after traffic stop, officer asked motorist if she had any "knives,
guns, drugs, dead bodies, grenades, rocket launchers, anything that shouldn't be in the vehicle").
2. See infra Part II (recounting United States Supreme Court search and seizure
jurisprudence).
3. See Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 202 (concluding canine sniff was inappropriate); People v.
Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219 (I11. 2003) (rendering inventory of vehicle impermissible), vacated by
sub. nom. Illinois v. Harris, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005); People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2003)
(finding officer's questioning of defendant to be beyond scope of stop); People v. Gherna, 784
N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 2003) (concluding the prolonged detention of defendant during traffic stop was
unreasonable); Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 275 (holding that dog sniff test during traffic stop for not
having rear registration light was impermissible); People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (Il1. 1999)
(holding officer's actions invalidated consent to search car and area).
4. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005) [hereinafter Caballes II] (holding that, under the
Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion is not required to conduct a dog sniff during a routine
traffic stop).
5. See infra Part II (examining United States Supreme Court's search and seizure cases).
6. See infra Part III (surveying Illinois search and seizure jurisprudence).
7. See infra Part IV (evaluating the Illinois courts' rationale in cases implicating search and
seizure principles).
2005]
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much like Illinois to measure the validity of aggressive police tactics!
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.9
As recently as 1949, the United States Supreme Court revered this
Amendment as "basic to a free society" because it protects the "security
of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police."' Over the
past thirty years, however, the Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment has changed significantly-the Court has broadened,
stretched, and bent it beyond recognition to preserve law enforcement's
wide authority to intrude into the affairs of citizens. This Section will
discuss a number of invasive law enforcement techniques that have
been upheld by the Court and will conclude that the Court's decisions
have resulted in the virtual elimination of Fourth Amendment protection
for motorists.
A. United States Supreme Court Case Law
Several types of interactions with police implicate search and seizure
principles requiring specific attention, including the investigatory stop,
the casual police encounter, consensual searches, and police
questioning.
1. The Investigatory Stop
In the early development of the United States Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court consistently required
probable cause in order to search or seize a person." In one case, the
8. See infra Part V (comparing other jurisdictions' approaches to law enforcement
investigatory techniques).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (describing the British
common law origins of the Fourth Amendment).
11. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[P]olice officers
up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts
within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause.");
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) ("The requirement of probable cause has roots
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Court defined probable cause as "evidence which would 'warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief' that a felony has been committed."' 2
This formulation of the Fourth Amendment changed dramatically in
1968 with the Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio.3 In Terry, the Court
upheld the police practice known as the "stop and frisk,"'14 thus
permitting officers to seize and search a person based on something less
than probable cause. 5 In deciding the case, the Court aimed to strike a
compromise between the needs of law enforcement and the rights of
citizens guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 16  While law
enforcement officers needed a set of flexible responses to address the
variety of situations they faced while on duty, '" the Court noted that the
Fourth Amendment traditionally imposed a "severe requirement of
specific justification" for intruding upon a person. 8  Based on these
considerations, the Court announced a two-prong standard for analyzing
the reasonableness of a stop and frisk.
that are deep in our history."); see also Timothy R. Lohraff, United States v. Leon and Illinois v.
Gates: A Call for State Courts to Develop State Constitutional Law, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 311,
315 (1987) ("Probable cause is the device the framers of the United States Constitution chose to
balance privacy rights against the state's duty to enforce the law.").
12. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (quoting Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)); see also Henry, 361 U.S. at 102 (citing Stacy v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642,
645 (1878) as stating: "Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer
warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed.").
13. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a discussion of Terry in its historical and legal
context, see David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975, 977-87
(1998).
14. Prior to Terry, many police officers were making use of this "low visibility" tactic to make
brief stops of citizens and frisk them for weapons. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.1(a) (2d ed. 1986). In the years leading up to
Terry, however, several courts and state legislatures authorized the practice. CHARLES H.
WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.01 (2d ed. 1986).
It is important to note the history from which the Court's decision in Terry arises. The Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), which extended the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to the states, suddenly placed significant restrictions on the ways in which state
law enforcement officials gathered evidence. Harris, supra note 13, at 977-78. Also, by 1968,
the turbulent events of the 1960s had taken their toll on American society, and politicians
increased pressure for "law and order" in the judicial system. Id. at 981. Terry tilted the balance
in favor of law enforcement by affirming the constitutionality of their powerful investigative
technique. Id. at 985.
15. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (describing the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence to allow
these searches with, for example, judicial approval).
16. Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 491, 492 (1999) (arguing that the attempted compromise has failed to accomplish
its goal of controlling stops and frisks); Harris, supra note 13, at 984.
17. Terry, 392 U.S. at 11, 20. The Court also considered the ability for officers to protect
themselves while on duty. Id. at 23-24.
18. Id. at 11.
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First, a court should determine "whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception."19  Thus, in order to effectuate a stop of a
person, an officer must point to "specific and articulable facts" along
with "any rational inferences from those facts."2 ° The stop must be
objectively reasonable, meaning an officer's good faith is not enough.2
Under the second prong, a court should evaluate whether the officer's
actions were "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place. 22 Thus, to lawfully search a
person for weapons, an officer must reasonably believe that the person
is "armed and dangerous., 23  The officer cannot rely on "his inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' but may draw specific
reasonable inferences based on his experience.24
The Court's decision in Terry legitimized the growing practice of
briefly stopping and questioning citizens, a practice now commonly
called an "investigative stop" or a "Terry stop. ' 25  Whereas police
officers previously were required to have probable cause to detain a
person, they could now briefly stop a person based on a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of wrongdoing.26 Although the Supreme Court has
not expressed a precise formula for determining what constitutes
27reasonable suspicion, numerous lower court cases have demonstrated
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id. at 21.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 20.
23. Id. at 27. It is important to emphasize that an officer's lawful stop of a citizen does not
automatically permit the officer to frisk the citizen. LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 9.4(a). In order
to conduct a frisk, an officer must have reasonable and articulable suspicion that the citizen may
be both armed and dangerous. Id. at § 7.2(e).
24. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
25. See LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 9.1(a).
26. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at § 9.02 (indicating that a police officer is
authorized to stop a person without probable cause if he can point to unusual conduct suggesting
criminal activity may be afoot); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically
Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 911, 952 (1989) ("As a result of Terry, officers are not
compelled to make a Hobson's choice between waiting for suspicious activity to play out in terms
of completed crimes, and prematurely intervening to arrest suspects who may be innocent.").
27. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981). In Cortez, the Court stated:
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is
sufficient to authorize police to stop a person. Terms like 'articulable reasons' and
'founded suspicion' are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance
dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has
been written is that the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be
taken into account. Based on that whole picture the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.
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that this is a fairly low standard.2s
Today, the most common type of Terry stop is a routine vehicle stop
for a traffic violation.29 An officer's observation of any traffic
infraction whatsoever can justify an investigatory stop of the vehicle
and its driver.3° Moreover, such observation gives rise to probable
cause, which means that an officer has the authority to arrest the
driver.31 The Court has held, however, that traffic stops are normally
brief and noncoercive, and thus, are treated as Terry stops.
32
Unlike routine traffic stops, brief vehicle stops at a highway
checkpoint or roadblock, in some circumstances, may be conducted
without any suspicion of wrongdoing.33 In City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond,34 however, the United States Supreme Court held that "a
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing" violated the Fourth Amendment.35
According to the Court, the narcotics interdiction checkpoint at issue in
Edmond did not aim to prevent the "immediate, vehicle-bound threat to
life and limb" that justified inspections for driver's licenses and drunk
drivers.36  Recently, the Court distinguished the impermissible
28. See LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 9 (providing a thorough analysis of the various grounds
for a Terry stop); see also Harris, supra note 13, at 1021 (criticizing the development of the Terry
rule to permit investigative techniques "based on categorical justifications that effectively widen
police discretion to the point that police may stop most people almost any time"). But see George
C. Thomas, Ill, Terry v. Ohio in the Trenches: A Glimpse at How Courts Apply "Reasonable
Suspicion", 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1025 (1998) (concluding that lower courts' application of the
Terry standard does not appear to be overwhelmingly permissive of police conduct).
29. Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled
Jurisprudence of a Doomed Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 1, 4 (2001).
30. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996) (rejecting the defendant's argument
that "the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations" makes it possible for the
police to stop anyone they wish and therefore requires a higher standard of justification).
31. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (upholding the officer's arrest of
the defendant for failing to wear a seat belt, a misdemeanor punishable by a twenty-five to fifty
dollar fine).
32. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984). In Berkemer, the Court also stated,
"We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the
bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop." Id at 439, n.29. See United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (authorizing the Border Patrol to make brief stops
of vehicles in which the officer reasonably suspects contains illegal aliens).
33. See Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 889 (2004) (providing information regarding a
recent crime); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (addressing drunk
driving checks); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (assessing driver's license
checks); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1976) (discussing the
interception of illegal aliens).
34. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id. at 43. The Court rejected the city's argument that its alleged secondary purposes of
verifying licenses and keeping impaired drivers off the road justified the roadbloack. Id. at 46.
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roadblock in Edmond from a checkpoint in which officers asked
motorists for information regarding a hit-and-run automobile accident.37
In that case, Illinois v. Lidster,3 8 the police did not seek to determine
whether the motorist himself was committing a crime, but instead, the
police sought information "to help find the perpetrator of a specific and
known crime., 39  The Court, finding the public concern justifying the
stop a "grave" one and the means to conduct the stop only minimally
intrusive, concluded that the roadblock in Lidster was constitutionally
permissible.4 °
2. Consensual Encounters
In addition to arrests and investigative stops, the Court has sanctioned
a third category of police-citizen encounters: the consensual encounter.4'
This type of encounter was recognized in Terry when the Court stated,
"Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens
involves 'seizures' of persons. 42  Whereas arrests and investigative
stops must be "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,43 a consensual encounter has no such requirement.4  Thus,
the Fourth Amendment is triggered only when a person becomes
"seized" by law enforcement officers.45
Clearly, simply being approached or questioned by a law
enforcement officer does not constitute a seizure. 46 However, the point
According to the Court, "[i]f this were the case, ... law enforcement authorities would be able to
establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or sobriety
check." Id.
37. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 889.
38. Id. at 885.
39. Id. at 891.
40. Id.
41. See generally, LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 9.3(a) (discussing situations in which the
suspect does not attempt to leave). This is sometimes referred to as law enforcement's
"community-caretaking" function. People v. Murray, 560 N.E.2d 309, 311-12 (111. 1990).
42. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968). The Court continued, "Only when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Id.
43. In other words, an arrest must be based on probable cause, and an investigative stop must
be based on reasonable suspicion.
44. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
552 (1980).
45. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 ("Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply
because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.").
46. Id. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983), the Court summarized the rules in
the following manner:
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he
[Vol. 36
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at which a person becomes seized for Fourth Amendment purposes
remained unclear until the Court's decision in United States v.
Mendenhall,47 a case in which Drug Enforcement Administration
41("DEA") agents approached the defendant at an airport. In that case,
Justice Potter Stewart, writing only for himself and Justice William
Rehnquist, determined that the encounter was consensual.49  They
decided that the appropriate standard for a consensual stop was an
objective one,5° in which a court should determine whether, "in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave."'" Stewart gave
several examples of relevant factors in making such a determination,
including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. 52  Although
only two justices supported the Mendenhall test, it appeared to garner a
majority of the Court three years later in Florida v. Royer.
53
The Court has continued to apply the Mendenhall test to determine
is willing to answer some questions, by putting some questions to him if the person is
willing to listen, or by offering [into] evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary
answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a
police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level
of objective justification. The person approached, however, need not answer any
questions put to him; indeed he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go
on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective
grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more,
furnish those grounds.
Id. (citations omitted).
47. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
48. In Mendenhall, two Drug Enforcement Administration agents stationed at an airport
spotted the defendant and believed she fit the agency's "drug courier profile." Id. at 547 n. I. The
agents approached her and, after identifying themselves as federal agents, asked for her
identification and her ticket. Id. at 547. After learning that the names on the documents did not
match, the agents asked her to accompany them to their office in the airport. Id. at 548.
49. Id. at 560. Justice Lewis Powell, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry
Blackmun, concurred in the judgment, concluding that the stop was justified by reasonable and
articulable suspicion. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 554 n.6 ("[T]he subjective intention of the DEA agent in this case to detain the
respondent, had she attempted to leave, is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been
conveyed to the respondent.").
51. Id. at 554.
52. Id.
53. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to
Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1272 (1990)
[hereinafter Maclin, The Decline]. The Mendenhall test was applied in the plurality opinion by
Justice Byron White, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall, Lewis Powell, and John Paul
Stevens, and also in Justice Harry Blackmun's dissenting opinion. Royer, 460 U.S. at 491.
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54when an encounter develops into a seizure, although the test was
complemented by another test in Florida v. Bostick 5  In Bostick, the
Court considered a police sweep of a bus as part of a drug interdiction
program and concluded that the Mendenhall "free-to-leave" standard
does not apply to bus sweeps and other situations in which a person's
freedom of movement is restricted by a "a factor independent of police
conduct."06 According to the Court, the "mere fact" that Bostick did not
wish to exit the bus and risk being stranded did not mean that the
encounter was coercive." Thus, to determine whether the passenger
was seized, the appropriate inquiry was "whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter.
' 58
3. Consensual Searches
Closely related to consensual encounters with the police is the
practice of consensual searches.59 Like consensual encounters, police
searches authorized by a citizen's consent do not require any
60justification whatsoever. Many officers find such consensual searches
attractive because they avoid the necessity of obtaining a search warrant
and they often include a broader scope to search than otherwise
permissible with a showing of probable cause. 6' This technique is also
54. See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (holding that the officers' pursuit
of the defendant did not constitute a "seizure"); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (finding
that no seizure occurred where an officer displayed his badge and asked the defendant to step
aside and talk to him).
55. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
56. Id. at 435-36.
57. Id. at 436.
58. Id. See also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (holding, in another bus sweep
case, that the encounter was consensual).
59. There are several possible reasons that a person might submit to a consensual search. A
person: (1) may be attempting to bluff the officer; (2) may not realize the consequences of a
search; (3) may be confused or frightened by the police presence; or (4) may feel that his refusal
to consent will lead to further suspicion. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at § 10.02
(relying upon Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1964), vacated by, 380 U.S. 260
(1965)). In addition, as one scholar noted, "Americans are not educated to say no to the police."
Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent (Less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 175, 189
(1991). See generally LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 8 (discussing consent searches).
60. See LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 8.1(c) (describing the nature and scope of consent in
police searches).
61. Id. at § 8.1. Besides conducting a consensual search, an officer can also utilize a number
of other exceptions to the search warrant requirement to search a vehicle during a routine traffic
stop. Such exceptions include the "plain view" exception, a search incident to arrest, an
inventory, and the automobile exception. Robert H. Whorf, "Coercive Ambiguity" in the Routine
Traffic Stop Turned Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 379, 382-90 (1997). See also Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 451 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the various
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62
attractive to law enforcement because it has proven highly effective.
An officer may make hundreds of consensual searches each year while
conducting traffic stops. 63  The technique, familiar to law enforcement
officers, often occurs in the following manner:
A police officer stops a vehicle for a routine traffic violation such as
speeding; the police officer asks the driver to get out of the vehicle;
the police officer chats in a friendly way with the driver and,
sometimes, with the passengers as well; the police officer issues a
warning rather than a citation for the traffic offense; the police officer
asks if the vehicle contains anything illegal; and then, right on the
heels of the inevitable denial, the police officer asks for permission to
search the vehicle. 64
In this way, consensual searches have become inextricably linked not61
only with traffic stops, but also with the war on drugs. Officers
commonly use a motorist's commission of a traffic violation as a pretext
for conducting a search of the vehicle in hopes of finding illegal
substances.66 Despite the problems surrounding the "routine traffic stop
turned consent search, 67 the United States Supreme Court has twice
upheld its constitutionality.
68
Prior to 1972, confusion existed as to whether a person's consent to a
search constituted a "waiver" of his Fourth Amendment right, which
must be obtained knowingly and intelligently pursuant to Johnson v.
exceptions to the search warrant requirement in connection with automobiles).
62. Whorf, supra note 29, at 3 ("Denials of consent to search in these circumstances are
apparently rare.").
63. Id.
64. Id. Likewise, the tactics of Georgia State Trooper B.E. "Benjie" Hodges have been
described as follows:
After stopping a vehicle for a traffic infraction, Hodges more often than not issues a
warning to the driver rather than a citation, chats with the driver in a folksy manner and
then obtains permission to look in the car. If consent forms are used, Hodges
downplays their importance by stating that the form is paperwork and that it is more
for his protection than anything else.
Mark G. Ledwin, Note, The Use of the Drug Courier Profile in Traffic Stops: Valid Police
Procedure or Fourth Amendment Violation?, 15 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 593, 606 (1988) (citing
United States v. Suarez, 694 F. Supp. 926, 930 (S.D. Ga. 1988)).
65. James A. Adams, The Supreme Court's Improbable Justifications for Restrictions of
Citizens' Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 833, 845
(1999); Whorf, supra note 29, at 5-6. See Ledwin, supra note 64, at 593 (detailing a routine
traffic stop that resulted in a narcotics arrest).
66. Whorf, supra note 29, at 5-6; David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's
Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 572-73 (1998) [hereinafter Car Wars].
67. Whorf, supra note 29, at 2 n.5 (using the term to describe motorists consenting to searches
if the right police technique is used).
68. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
248-49 (1973).
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Zerbst.69  Although application of this long-standing doctrine to
consensual searches seemed natural, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte70 the
Supreme Court refused to apply Zerbst to this context.7 In this 1972
case involving a vehicle search following a routine traffic stop,72 the
Court noted that in previous cases, it had applied the Zerbst standard to
analyze waivers "in the context of the safeguards of a fair criminal
trial."73 In vague and conclusory language, the Court stated that the
''protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order,
and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment
of truth at a criminal trial. 74  Furthermore, the Court observed that it
would be "thoroughly impractical" to require officers to inform a person
of his right to refuse consent.75
Nonetheless, in Schneckloth, the Court acknowledged that a person's
consent to be searched must be given "freely and voluntarily. 76 Unable
to formulate a "talismanic definition" of "voluntary," the Court instead
held that the totality of the circumstances should dictate whether a
person's consent was voluntary.77  The factors to consider include the
defendant's age, education, intelligence, "lack of any advice... of his
constitutional rights," the length of detention, and "the repeated and
prolonged nature of the questioning., 78 The Court also rejected a formal
requirement that a defendant have actual knowledge of his right to
refuse to consent and instead relegated this to a permissible factor of
voluntariness.79
In 1996, the Court again rejected a challenge to the consensual search
69. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 8.1(a). The Court, since its 1938 decision in Johnson v. Zerbst,
held that a waiver of a constitutional right is an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled on other
grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Applying Zerbst to consensual searches,
then, a person could waive his Fourth Amendment right only if he knew of the fight and
intentionally relinquished that right. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 8. 1(a).
70. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1972).
71. Id. at 246.
72. The defendant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for having a burned-out headlight and
license plate light. Id. at 220. An officer asked another passenger for permission to search the
car, and the passenger replied, "Sure go ahead." Id. The search revealed, "[w]added up under the
left rear seat," three stolen checks. Id.
73. Id. at 235.
74. Id. at 242.
75. Id. at 231.
76. Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). The prosecutor
bears the burden of proof to show consent was voluntary. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548.
77. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224-27.
78. Id. at 226 (internal citations omitted).
79. Id. at 248-49.
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in Ohio v. Robinette.8 ° In that case, a police officer stopped the
defendant for speeding.8 The officer asked the defendant for his license
and checked for outstanding warrants, finding none.8 2 The officer then
asked the defendant to step out of the car, issued a verbal warning, and
returned his license. 8' Next, the officer said to the defendant, "One
question before you get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband
in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?
8 4
After the defendant answered that he had none, the officer asked for
permission to search his car.85 The defendant agreed, and the officer's
search uncovered drugs.86
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the defendant was *illegally
detained when the officer asked him to exit his vehicle.87 The court
observed that these "routine traffic stops turned consent searches"
88
involved a "seamless" transition between a person's detention and the
purportedly consensual exchange.89 Further, "[t]he undetectability of
that transition may be used by police officers to coerce citizens into
answering questions that they need not answer, or to allow a search of a
vehicle that they are not legally obligated to allow." 90  Applying the
Mendenhall free-to-leave test, the court concluded:
Most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody
as long as the officer continues to interrogate them. The police officer
retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the
officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to
most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk
away as the officer continues to address him.9'
To emphasize the clear break between the legal detention and the
consensual encounter, the court held that, at the conclusion of the traffic
stop, officers were required to inform motorists that they were free to
80. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
81. Id. at 35.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 35-36.
85. Id. at 36.
86. Id. The officer found a small amount of marijuana and a pill of methylenedioxy-
methamphetamine. Id.
87. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Ohio 1995), rev'd by Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33 (1996).
88. See supra note 67 (attributing the genesis of the term "consent search" to Professor
Whorf).
89. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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leave.92
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the United States Constitution mandated the rule announced by
the Ohio Supreme Court.93 In a brief opinion by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, the Court reversed the judgment.94 The Court reiterated its
holding in Schneckloth that a person's consent may be valid even
though the person did not know of his right to refuse consent.95  In
addition, the Court continued its avoidance of bright line rules regarding
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement and held that the
Ohio Supreme Court's per se rule would be unrealistic in its
application.96
Therefore, after Schneckloth and Robinette, a police officer need not
inform a citizen, before he consents to a search, that (1) he has the right
to refuse consent and (2) he is free to leave.97 Instead, these factors bear
on whether the citizen's consent was voluntary, based on the totality of
the circumstances.98
4. Police Questioning
The final constitutional issue regarding police conduct in traffic stops
is the extent to which officers can question motorists during the stop.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this
issue, a number of federal circuit courts have considered the issue and
have come to differing conclusions.99 For instance, in United States v.
Shabazz,'° the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that Terry's scope inquiry restricted only the length of time an officer
92. Id. at 699.
93. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 36 (1996).
94. Id. at 40.
95. Id. at 39.
96. Id. at 39-40.
97. Id.; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
98. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40; Adams, supra note 65, at 847.
99. See Amy L. Vazquez, Note, "Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead Bodies in Your
Car?" What Questions Can a Police Officer Ask During a Traffic Stop?, 76 TuL. L. REV. 211(2001) (discussing the circuit split over allowable police conduct at traffic stops). Vazquez
argues that the Holt standard, which considers both the scope and duration of a Terry stop, is the
correct articulation of the rule. Id. at 226-27; Vazquez also encourages the United States
Supreme Court to settle the dispute by granting certiorari in a case involving this issue. Id. at
225. See United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001); Bill Lawrence, Note, The Scope
of Police Questioning During a Routine Traffic Stop: Do Questions Outside the Scope of the
Original Justification for the Stop Create Impermissible Seizures if They Do Not Prolong the
Stop?, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1919, 1927-28 (2003) (discussing United States v. Childs, 277
F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2002) which upheld the officer's questioning that was unrelated to the
original purpose for the stop, but did not prolong the detention).
100. United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1993).
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could detain a driver.' °' Thus, in Shabazz, unrelated questioning during
a traffic stop was not improper because the officers were still waiting
for the results of Shabazz's computer check.10 2 On the other hand, in
United States v. Holt,'0 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that Terry imposed limits on both the length and
manner of a detention.' °4  In that case, the officer's unrelated
questioning while he was writing a ticket was held invalid.'0 5
Despite the Court's lack of guidance on the broad issue, its 2004
opinion in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada,116 addressed
the narrow issue of the validity of an officer's request for
identification.' 7 In Hiibel, an officer investigated a report that a woman
had been assaulted while in the defendant's truck.0 8  The officer
approached the truck and asked the defendant for identification, but he
refused to comply with the officer's request.' °9 The defendant was
subsequently convicted under a Nevada statute that required a person
detained pursuant to an investigatory stop to identify himself to the
officer."0 The United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
Fourth Amendment challenge to the law."' Noting that "[a]sking
questions is an essential part of police investigations,"'" 2 the Court held
that a request for identification under the Nevada law was consistent
with the Terry standard because it "has an immediate relation to the
purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.""..3
Furthermore, the law "does not alter the nature of the stop itself: it does
not change its duration, or its location."
'
"
4
101. Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 437-38 (recognizing a need to balance the law enforcement
purposes of a stop and the time reasonably needed to accomplish those purposes). See supra note
22 and accompanying text (describing the second prong of the Terry test as whether the officer's
actions were "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place").
102. Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 438
103. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001).
104. Id. at 1230.
105. Id.
106. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
107. Id. at 2455.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2455-56 (referring to NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003)).
111. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457. The Court also rejected Hiibel's Fifth Amendment challenge
to the law. Id. at 2460-61.
112. Id. at 2458.
113. Id. at 2459.
114. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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B. The Court's Lack of Oversight
The United States Supreme Court's permissive approach to the
Fourth Amendment during the past thirty years has subjected the Court
to a great deal of scholarly criticism."' In cases involving vehicles, one
scholar has concluded that "it is no exaggeration to say that in cases
involving cars, the Fourth Amendment is all but dead."' 6 Indeed, the
Court's decisions have overwhelmingly favored law enforcement's
powers over the rights of motorists." 7 These cases give police officers a
broad array of legal justifications for effectuating traffic stops"8 and
115. See, e.g., James A. Adams, Search and Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are
They Serious or Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413, 471 (1993)
("Failure or refusal to consider the Court's treatment of the foregoing issues as humor leads to a
conclusion that the Court lacks candor and is applying theories inconsistently."); Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 757 (1994) ("The Fourth
Amendment today is an embarrassment."); JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA 52
(1992).
In virtually every case, [the Court] will state that the warrant requirement and probable
cause test is the standard that normally is to be employed in assessing the propriety of a
police search and seizure and, thereafter, as it suits the Court's convenience, invoke
this or that exception or the doctrine in order to conclude all was fair and reasonable.
Id.; Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine,"
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1843 (2004) (finding the courts are engaged
in "judicial straining to aid law enforcement and ... undervaluing ... the Fourth Amendment
protection of privacy and freedom from government intrusion").
Professor Maclin painted a grim picture of life under the Court's Fourth Amendment holdings:
While the Court has continued to expand police authority, our right of locomotion has
been sharply curtailed. Law-abiding persons can be accosted and questioned by police
officers at any time. An individual, in effect, can be required to "show his papers" to a
curious officer, even though the officer has no reason to suspect the person of
wrongdoing. Citizens may be chased down the streets at the whim of patrolling police
officers.
Maclin, The Decline, supra note 53, at 1335.
116. Harris, Car Wars, supra note 66, at 556. See Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on
the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 117, 144 (2001) (criticizing the Court for applying
Fourth Amendment principles governing pedestrians to traffic stops) [hereinafter Maclin, The
Fourth].
117. Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 889 (2004). Lidster is one of the most recent Fourth
Amendment cases involving vehicles in which Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for a unanimous
Court, wryly noted, "The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle." Id. at
889. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Lidster case).
118. David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 558-59 (1997) [hereinafter,
Driving While Black]. For example, Professor Harris cites a number of traffic "violations" that
police have at their disposal to effectuate a traffic stop:
[I]n any number of jurisdictions, police can stop drivers not only for driving too fast,
but for driving too slow. In Utah, drivers must signal for at least three seconds before
changing lanes; a two second signal would violate the law. In many states, a driver
must signal for at least one hundred feet before turning right; ninety-five feet would
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conducting searches of vehicles." 9
However, the Court's 1996 decision in Whren v. United States
illustrates a more fundamental problem.' 20  In Whren, plainclothes
officers in an unmarked car stopped the defendant's vehicle after the
officers observed the vehicle stopped at a stop sign for more than
twenty seconds while the driver looked into the passenger's lap.' 2' The
defendant challenged the stop, arguing that state motor vehicle codes
are so broad in scope that no one can possibly comply with the
regulations at all times. 122  Thus, the defendant argued, an officer,
following a vehicle long enough to observe a traffic violation, can use
the traffic stop as a pretext to stop whomever they wish for any
purpose.12' The Court, however, unanimously rejected the defendant's
argument.' 24  In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held
that an officer's actual motivations for conducting a stop "play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."'
' 25
make the driver a offender. And the driver making that right turn may not slow down
"suddenly" (undefined) without signaling. Many states have made it a crime to drive
with a malfunctioning taillight, a rear-tag illumination bulb that does not work, or tires
without sufficient tread. They also require drivers to display not only license tags, but
yearly validation stickers, pollution control stickers, and safety inspection stickers;
driving without these items displayed on the vehicle in the proper place violates the
law.
Id. (citations omitted). In Illinois, courts have upheld a variety of bases for conducting a traffic
stop. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 802 N.E.2d 850, 852-53 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2003)
(sanctioning a police traffic stop based on twenty-second delay in proceeding through an
intersection after a traffic light has changed to green); People v. Greco, 783 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2003) (approving police traffic stop where driver was weaving within a single
lane of traffic); People v. Rush, 745 N.E.2d 157, 162 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001) (permitting
traffic stop due to single, momentary crossing of the center line, unless an officer has additional
facts to explain the lane cross); People v. Mendoza, 599 N.E.2d 1375, 1383-84 (I11. App. Ct. 5th
Dist. 1992) (upholding police action based on fuzzy dice and other objects hanging from rear
view mirror); People v. Strawn, 569 N.E.2d 269, 273 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist 1991) (finding stop
resulting from tinted windows proper); People v. Houlihan, 521 N.E.2d 277, 281-82 (Ill. App. Ct.
2d Dist 1988) (allowing defective muffler and exhaust system to justify traffic stop); People v.
Hardy, 491 N.E.2d 493, 498-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist 1986) (authorizing police stop where
unfamiliar vehicle was parked "in the shadows" at 5:20 am with engine running).
119. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 451-53 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing the various exceptions to the search warrant requirement in connection with
automobiles).
120. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
121. Id. at 808. Subsequently, an officer observed, in plain view, two bags of crack cocaine in
the defendant's hands. Id. at 808-09.
122. Id. at 818.
123. Id. See Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 118, at 558 ("Police officers in some
jurisdictions have a rule of thumb: the average driver cannot go three blocks without violating
some traffic regulation.").
124. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813-19.
125. Id. at 813 (emphasis added). See also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text
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Furthermore, the Court declined to balance the interests of police and
motorists to address the issues raised by the defendant. 1
2 6
In Whren, the Court absolutely refused to place any restrictions on an
officer's ability to use the variety of investigative techniques available
to them. 127  Moreover, the entire Court seemed unconcerned with the
implications of its decision.'28 Consequently, an officer's racially-
motivated reasons to stop a motorist or an officer's desire to conduct a
fishing expedition for drugs or other evidence of criminality are wholly
irrelevant. 129  Thus, under case law once an officer has witnessed the
violation of even a minor traffic law, the Fourth Amendment places
virtually no further restrictions on his conduct.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS' APPROACH
Against the backdrop of the United States Supreme Court's
permissive approach toward police conduct during traffic stops, the
Supreme Court of Illinois has announced, in rapid-fire succession, a
series of cases that have dramatically changed the law governing traffic
stops in this state. 30 Although the Supreme Court of Illinois in previous
cases has followed a "lockstep" doctrine with respect to the Fourth
Amendment13'-in which the court interprets search and seizure
(describing objective standard).
126. id. at 817-18.
127. See Maclin, The Fourth, supra note 116, at 134-35 (noting that, in consensual encounter
cases, the Court has held that a typical police-citizen encounter will not constitute a seizure
because a contrary rule would bar valid police practices, including police questioning).
128. Whren, 517 U.S. at 819. But see Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997)
(upholding an officer's ability to order passengers to exit the vehicle during a lawful traffic stop).
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, stated that "[tihe practical effect of our holding in Wrehn, of
course, is to allow the police to stop vehicles in almost countless circumstances." Id. at 423
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy worried Whren and Wilson put "tens of millions of
passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129. David A. Harris, The Use of Traffic Stops Against Aftrican-Americans: What Can Be
Done?, I J.L. Soc'Y 91, 94 (1999) (stating that, after Whren, the "real reasons for the stop do not
matter" because the "ever-present traffic offense provides all the justification needed for a
temporary stop") [hereinafter Traffic Stops].
130. See generally ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.26 (Ralph Ruebner, ed.) (2004)
(providing examples of Illinois cases defining the scope of an allowable search); supra note 3
(listing Illinois cases outside the lockstep approach of U.S. Supreme court cases); infra Part III
(discussing Supreme Court of Illinois decisions that place greater restrictions on police steps than
United States Supreme Court cases).
131. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1016-17 (111. 1995) (applying the holding
of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), which held the "plain feel" doctrine during pat
downs does not violate the Fourth Amendment, to the Illinois Constitution); People v. Tisler, 469
N.E.2d 147, 156-57 (I11. 1984) (citing, as examples of prior applications of the lockstep doctrine,
People v. Power, 295 N.E.2d 472 (Ill. 1973), People v. Jackson, 176 N.E.2d 803 (I11. 1961), and
People v. Tillman, 116 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 1953)). See generally Thomas B. McAffee, The Illinois
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questions arising out of the Illinois Constitution in line with decisions
by the United States Supreme Court-the analyses in the recent cases
significantly depart from those used in the United States Supreme Court
decisions. In effect, the Illinois cases have severely limited the conduct
of law enforcement during routine traffic stops and eliminated many of
law enforcement's investigative techniques. This Section will review
these cases and interpret the rules that have resulted from the decisions.
A. Continued Detentions
In People v. Brownlee3 ' and People v. Gherna,'33 the Supreme Court
of Illinois decided that the police officers in those cases
unconstitutionally detained the motorists beyond the purposes of the
traffic stops. Aside from the restrictive holdings of the cases, the
opinions are also noteworthy for their thorough and candid examination
of the circumstances of the stop.
1. People v. Brownlee: Court's Scrutiny Reveals a Continued Detention
The Supreme Court of Illinois' close scrutiny of traffic stops began
with its 1999 decision in Brownlee. 34 In that case, the Court examined
what appeared to be a routine traffic stop turned consensual search. 35
However, the Court did not focus on the circumstances of the search,
but rather on the officer's continued detention of the driver, which it
held to be improper.136
In Brownlee, two police officers stopped a vehicle for failing to
activate a turn signal within one hundred feet of an intersection and
stopping two feet past a stop sign. 3 7 After obtaining the identities of the
Bill of Rights And Our Independent Legal Tradition: A Critique Of The Illinois Lockstep
Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, passim (1987) (providing a history of the lockstep doctrine in
Illinois and criticizing its continued use by the court).
In order to find greater protection of Fourth Amendment rights in the Art. I, § 6 of the Illinois
Constitution, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that it must find "in the language of our
constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports of the constitutional convention,
something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed
differently than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they are patterned."
Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 157.
132. People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (I11. 999).
133. People v. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d 799 (I11. 2003).
134. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d at 556.
135. Id. at 559.
136. Id. at 560, 562-66.
137. Id. at 559. The officers had been patrolling for drug activity when they drove past a car
that had stopped in front of an apartment complex. Id. When the car stopped, a person exited the
vehicle, knocked on a residence door, and then returned to the car. Id. According to the officers,
crack houses were known to exist in that area, and it was common for people "to pull up, run up
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passengers, including the defendant, the officers returned to their
vehicle and performed a warrant check.'38 Finding no outstanding
warrants, the officers returned to the stopped car, where one officer
returned the driver's license and insurance card and stated that they
would not issue any citations." 9 Then, the officer "paused a couple [of]
minutes," before asking the driver for permission to search the car.'40
The driver asked if he had a choice, and the officer responded
affirmatively and said that he was "asking."44 The driver said, "Okay,
you can search," and the police subsequently discovered an open bottle
of beer and two marijuana "blunts.' '142  All the passengers were
arrested. 1
43
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in an opinion by Justice Michael
Bilandic, first examined the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Robinette.'44 While Robinette reaffirmed a totality-of-the-
circumstances test to determine whether consent is voluntarily given,
the court interpreted the issue in Brownlee as requiring considerations
that are independent of the consensual search issue. 45 Unlike Robinette,
in Brownlee the officers detained the car before requesting permission
to search the car. 14 6 Thus, Robinette did not control the outcome of the
147
case.
Next, the state argued that following the officer's statement that no
citations would be issued, the ensuing encounter between the driver and
to a home for just a moment, make a buy and leave." Id. Aware of such practices, the officers
followed the car until they observed its driver commit two traffic violations. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (alteration in original). When the officers first approached the car, they saw
Brownlee holding an unopened bottle of beer, which did not violate the law. Id. Upon asking the
driver for permission to search, the officer explained that they "were concerned that there might
be more alcohol in the car." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 559-60.
143. Id. at 560. A search incident to Brownlee's arrest revealed more drugs, resulting in a
charge against Brownlee of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance containing
cocaine. Id. at 558, 560.
144. Id. at 562-64.
145. Id. at 563.
146. Id. The court described the difference between the two cases as follows: "Certainly
Robinette does not stand for the proposition that, following the conclusion of a lawful traffic stop,
officers may detain a vehicle without reasonable suspicion of any illegal activity and for any
amount of time, so long as they ultimately request and obtain permission to search the car." Id.
147. Id. at 563-64. Because Robinette was not controlling, the court also stated that it could
not determine whether the Illinois search and seizure provision could be interpreted in lockstep
with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
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the officer was consensual.14  The Court rejected this argument,
however, applying the Mendenhall standard and concluding that a
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. 149  The court
emphasized the officer's "two-minute" pause and explained that the
officers stood in front of the car's doors for two minutes without saying
anything.5 ° Thus, their conduct constituted a show of authority to
which a reasonable person would feel obligated to submit. 151 If the
driver had driven away, a reasonable person would believe that "the two
officers would soon be in hot pursuit."'52 The driver therefore did not
submit to a consensual encounter, but instead was subject to a seizure.153
For a lawful seizure, the officers needed to have had at least a
reasonable and objective suspicion for the detention. 5 4 However, after
the completion of the initial stop for the two traffic violations, the
officers had no such basis to continue to detain the car."' Thus, the
court reversed the decision of the appellate court and affirmed the
suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of the detention. 
56
2. People v. Gherna: 'Casual Talking' Leads to Illegal Detention
Four years after Brownlee, the Supreme Court of Illinois again
invalidated an officer's continued detention of a driver after an
investigatory stop in Gherna.'57 In Gherna, two officers were on bike
patrol when they saw the defendant and another female sitting in a
pickup truck in a parking lot.'58 As the officers rode past the truck, they
saw a beer bottle in a cup holder between the two females, who
appeared "pretty young."'5 9 Suspecting underage drinking and an open-
bottle violation, the officers approached either side of the truck, placing
their bikes against the vehicle.' 6°  They then determined that the
defendant was older than twenty-one years old, the other passenger was
her thirteen-year-old daughter, and the beer bottle was unopened and in
148. Id. at 564.
149. Id. at 565-66.
150. Id. at 566.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 566.
156. Id.
157. People v. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d 799, 810-11 (111. 2003).
158. Id. at 801.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 801-03.
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its original container. 6  At this point, one officer began "casually
talking" to the defendant and asked her to step out of the car "so [he]
could speak with her in private, not around her 13-year-old daughter." '162
After she stepped outside of the vehicle, the officer asked if she had any
drugs or narcotics.1 63  After the defendant responded that she did not,
she began emptying her pockets, and a plastic bag containing drugs fell
out of her pocket. '64 Prior to trial, the circuit court, relying on
Brownlee, suppressed the drugs as the product of an unlawful continued
detention. 165  The Supreme Court of Illinois, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Mary Ann McMorrow, unanimously affirmed the trial court's
suppression of the evidence.' 66
The State first argued that the officers' contact with the defendant
was consensual and therefore outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. 167 However, the court held that a reasonable person would
have felt compelled to submit to the officer's requests. 16  Applying the
United States Supreme Court's language from Bostick 69  and
Mendenhall,170 the court found that the officers conveyed an official
show of authority when they positioned themselves on either side of the
car and placed their bikes against the vehicle. 17' In addition, the
161. Id. at 801-02.
162. Id. at 802 (alteration in original). The officer testified that during the conversation, the
defendant became "very nervous." Id. The officer had been peering into the car with a flashlight
and noticed something resembling a credit card underneath the defendant's thigh. Id. at 802-03.
He asked her about the card, which was revealed to be an Illinois Link card under the name
Lowell Briggs. Id. at 802. The defendant stated that "she did not know how the card got into her
vehicle and that possibly someone had dropped it there when the police arrived." Id.
163. Id. at 802. The officer asked whether she had "'anything on her that belonged to Lowell
Briggs', including any illegal drugs or narcotics ... " Id. The officer also asked if there was
anything else belonging to Lowell Briggs in her vehicle that she did not know about, to which the
defendant replied that he was "free to look." Id.
164. Id. at 802-03.
165. Id. at 804.
166. Id. at 812 (refraining from participating in the decision were Justices Rita Garman and
Philip Rarick).
167. Id. at 806-07.
168. Id. at 808.
169. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (evaluating "whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter"); see also
supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Bostick case, which held that the
Mendenhall free-to-leave standard does not apply to bus sweeps).
170. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (explaining that a detention
results "if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave"). See also supra notes 47-54 and
accompanying text (recounting the facts and holding of the Mendenhall case, which states that a
seizure occurs when a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave).
171. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d at 808. The Court rejected the State's argument that, because the
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officers' questions "communicated to a reasonable person that [she] was
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about [her]
business.,,172 Therefore, the encounter was not consensual.'
73
The court next addressed the propriety of the encounter as a Terry
stop. 7 4 Finding the case controlled by Brownlee, the court held that the
initial stop of the defendant was proper because the officers had
reasonable suspicion of underage drinking. 75  However, once the
officers' suspicions of underage drinking had been "allayed," the
specific reason for the stop had concluded, and they "did not indicate in
word or manner that defendant was free to leave, even though the
officers harbored no reasonable suspicion of any other criminal conduct
on defendant's part.,, 176 The officers remained positioned on both sides
of the truck. 77  More importantly, they continued to question the
defendant while using a flashlight to peer into the truck.178 Therefore,
the court held that the defendant's detention was improper.
7 9
B. The Scope of Investigatory Stops
The Supreme Court of Illinois has filled the void left by the United
States Supreme Court's lack of guidance by developing a logical three-
part inquiry for analyzing the permissible scope of investigatory
stops. 180 This section will discuss this inquiry and its application, which
has resulted in a restriction of police questioning and warrant checks
during traffic stops.
1. People v. Gonzalez: The Court Develops a Scope Inquiry
In Gonzalez,'8' the Supreme Court of Illinois considered the extent to
which police officers can question the occupants of a vehicle during a
traffic stop and formulated its own three-step approach to analyzing this
issue. 82 In this case, the defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for
officers were assigned to bike patrol, their law enforcement authority was diminished. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437).
173. Id. at 808.
174. Id. at 808-10.
175. Id. at810-11.
176. Id. at 811.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 811.
179. Id. at 812.
180. See People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 269-70 (Ill. 2003) (outlining the method that
Illinois courts should use to determine the validity of investigatory stops).
181. Id. at 260.
182. Id. at 270.
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failing to display a front license plate.'83 Although the officer "observed
no criminal conduct by defendant," he asked for his identification.' 1 4
The officer then ran a computer check on the defendant and discovered
that he was a gang member with a "lengthy criminal history" and was
on parole.18  The officer testified that this information led him to
believe the defendant may have been carrying a weapon. 186 Therefore,
the officer asked the defendant to exit the vehicle in order to conduct a
pat-down search. 187 During the pat-down search, the officer discovered
drugs in the defendant's coat pocket. 188 Prior to trial, the circuit court
granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. 8 9
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in an opinion by Justice Thomas
Fitzgerald, addressed the issue by focusing on the second prong of the
Terry inquiry, which examines whether a stop is "reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."' 90 Acknowledging a "divergence of opinion" 9' as to whether
the second prong of the Terry test limits only the length of a detention 92
or the length and manner of detention,' 93 the court concluded that
neither test struck the appropriate balance. 194 Although every question
asked by police should not be strictly limited to the purpose of a stop,
the court also recognized that "unfettered" police questioning is
inappropriate.1
95
Instead, the court adopted a three-part inquiry 196 that forbids officers
from "fundamentally altering the nature of the stop.., absent an
independent basis for reasonable articulable suspicion or probable
183. Id. at 262.
184. Id.
185. People v. Gonzalez, 753 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1211-12.
188. Id. at 1212.
189. Id. at 263.
190. Id. at 266 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
191. Id..
192. See United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that four
minutes was not an unreasonable amount of time for an officer to run a license check while
detaining a motorist who was stopped for speeding).
193. See United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that to
determine if a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment a court should determine
the length of detention and the manner in which the detention was carried out).
194. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 268-69.
195. Id.
196. This inquiry was initially expressed in a partial concurrence and partial dissent in Holt,
264 F.3d at 1240 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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cause."' 97 Under this inquiry, a question is permissible if, first, it is
"reasonably related to the purpose of the stop" or, second, there is
"reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question."' 98
However, if the question is not justified under either of these standards,
the third and final question is whether "in light of all the circumstances
and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention
or changed the fundamental nature of the stop."' 99
The court used its test to determine whether the officer's request for
identification of the defendant, a passenger in the car, was proper.2°0
First, the identification of "a passive occupant" was not reasonably
related to the initial stop for a missing license plate.20' Similarly, the
officer had no reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant
was participating in criminal activity. 2  However, under the third prong
of the test, the court determined that the question did not prolong the
detention or change the fundamental nature of the stop.203 The request
for identification is "facially innocuous" and "does not suggest official
interrogation," especially since the defendant was not required to
comply.2°4  In addition, such a request would not "increase the
confrontational nature of the encounter." 205 Thus, the officer's request
was proper, and the subsequent search constitutional.2 6
Justice Robert Thomas specially concurred in the case, agreeing with
the result but applying different standards to the driver and passengers
during a traffic stop. 20 7 According to Justice Thomas, the driver of a
lawfully stopped car is permissibly detained and obviously required to
submit to the officer's authority.20 8 However, a passenger in a car is not
detained because he is the subject of an investigation but because he is a
passenger in a car that [has] not yet reached its destination.
Because the passenger was detained for a reason independent of police
197. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 269 (quoting Holt, 264 F.3d at 1240 (Murphy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
198. Id. at 270.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id..
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 271 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
208. Id. (Thomas, J., specially concurring)..
209. Id. at 272 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
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conduct, the Bostick standard should apply. 2'0  Here, the officer's
request for identification was "facially innocuous and was done in a
nonthreatening manner. Therefore, the encounter was consensual,
and the defendant's detention proper. Justice Thomas also noted that
the majority's test, while purportedly derived from Holt, was essentially
the same test he applied, since both tests ultimately confirmed the
encounter's consensual nature.213  Although both tests led to identical
conclusions, Justice Thomas argued that the majority's test did not
provide enough guidance to the lower courts. 4 He stated that "in future
cases it will be difficult for the lower courts to determine what does and
does not change the fundamental nature of the stop. 215
2. People v. Bunch: Gonzalez Test Invalidates Officer's Questioning
In People v. Bunch,2t 6 the Court again applied the Gonzalez test but
came to the opposite conclusion, finding the questioning of a vehicle's
occupant improper.1 7 In this case, an officer stopped a car when he
noticed its brake lights were not functioning.2 8 When the driver could
not produce his driver's license, the officer placed him under arrest and
walked him to the rear of the car.2 9 Next, the officer approached the
defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, and asked him to step out of the
car.220  Then, the officer, standing a foot away from the defendant,
shined a flashlight on the defendant's face and asked, "What's your
name? Where you [sic] coming from?" 22' The defendant told the
officer his name and then asked why the driver was being arrested.222
210. Id. at 272 (Thomas, J., specially concurring). In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436
(1991), the United States Supreme Court inquired whether the defendant, a passenger on a bus,
"would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." See
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (noting that the Mendenhall "free-to-leave" standard
does not apply to situations like bus sweeps).
211. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 273 (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
212. Id. (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
213. Id. (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
214. Id. (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
215. Id. (Thomas, J., specially concurring).
216. People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2003).
217. Id. at 1033-34.
218. Id. at 1026.
219. Id. at 1027.
220. Id.
221. Id. According to the officer, he asked the defendant's name because he "was curious to
find out exactly who he was." Id. The officer testified that he often shined his flashlight in
people's eyes when he questioned them at night because there was a "strong possibility they may
have something in their mouths." Id. However, the officer denied that he questioned Bunch
solely to see if there was something in his mouth. Id.
222. Id.
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During the conversation, the officer noticed a "small, clear plastic item,
containing something white" in the defendant's mouth.223 Based on the
officer's experience, he believed the object in the defendant's mouth
contained drugs.224 The officer placed the defendant under arrest and
ordered him to spit out the object, which indeed contained drugs.
25
In an opinion by Justice Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court of Illinois
applied the framework established in Gonzalez. 26 The court first
determined that the officer's questions-"What's your name?" and
"Where you [sic] coming from?"-were not related to the purpose of
the stop for failing brake lights.227  Likewise, the officer's questions
were not justified by reasonable and articulable suspicion, because the
defendant was "simply a passive occupant of the car., 228 Thus, the court
turned to the third inquiry-whether the officer's questions prolonged
the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.2 29 In this
case, the questioning took place after the officer arrested the driver and
decided to have the car towed, meaning the purpose of the stop had
concluded. 230 The court distinguished this from the valid questioning in
Gonzalez, in which the officer's questions occurred while the driver was
still being processed.231
The court also rejected the State's argument that the defendant's
conversation with the officer was consensual. 32 According to the court,
as in Brownlee, the officer's purpose for the stop concluded before the
conversation began.233 Furthermore, the officer's close proximity and
his use of the flashlight constituted a show of authority to which a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave.234
Justice Rita Garman concurred in part, agreeing that the Gonzalez
framework should apply as a matter of stare decisis.23' However, she
dissented from the majority's conclusion that the stop was prolonged.236
According to Justice Garman, the "two simple questions" were asked
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1030.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1031.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1032.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1033 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236. Id at 1034-35 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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shortly after the officer ordered the defendant out of the car and did not
unnecessarily prolong his detention.237 Justice Garman then examined
whether the questions altered the fundamental nature of the stop and
concluded that this standard forbade only questions "reasonably
calculated to elicit incriminating responses. 238  In this case, the
defendant's name and his previous location were not likely to constitute
incriminating responses; instead, the item in his mouth incriminated
him. 239  Thus, Justice Garman would have found the officer's
questioning to be proper.24°
Justice Thomas, who specially concurred in Gonzalez, dissented
here.24' Justice Thomas stated that the majority's decision contradicted
"a wealth of well-settled fourth amendment law" and improperly
extended Gonzalez and Brownlee to the present case.242 According to
him, the need for a Gonzalez inquiry ceased when the defendant exited
the car, and thus, the proper inquiry should have proceeded under the
Bostick test.24 ' Bunch's response to the officer-in which he did not
reveal where he was coming from, but instead asked another question-
showed "without- a doubt, that he believed he was free to decline the
officer's request.",
244
Even under the majority's standard, Justice Thomas argued that the
questions were permissible, because they were related to the purpose of
the stop.24s  According to Justice Thomas, the purpose of the stop
broadened once the driver was arrested and included the encounter with
the passenger.246 At that point, the officer had many reasons to converse
with the passenger, who was to be stranded as a result of the driver's
arrest. 24 7  Justice Thomas also distinguished the case from Brownlee,
237. Id. at 1034 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238. Id. at 1035 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. Id. at 1035 (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240. Id. (Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id. at 1035-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 1035 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 1036-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Thomas echoed his Gonzalez
special concurrence, in which he argued that different standards applied to drivers and passengers
of vehicles. See People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 272-73 (I11. 2003) (Thomas, J., specially
concurring) (asserting that the Bostick standard should apply only when a passenger is detained
for a reason independent of police conduct but not for any other lawfully stopped car); see also
supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's dissent in Gonzalez).
244. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d at 1036 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 1037 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
246. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 1038 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "That the officer, out of courtesy, may have wanted
to explain the reason for the arrest or that he may have been concerned for the passenger as he
attempted to arrange his way home does not mean that the encounter continued to be a
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because the defendant was not a driver and the officer here did not make
a comparable show of authority.248
3. People v. Harris: Gonzalez Invalidates Warrant Checks
In People v. Harris,249 the Supreme Court of Illinois extended the
Gonzalez inquiry beyond simple police questioning and into the police
practice of conducting warrant checks.250 In addition, for the first time,
the court held that an officer's conduct improperly changed the
fundamental nature of the stop.
251
In this case, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for
making an illegal left tum.25 2 When the officer learned that the driver's
license was suspended or revoked, he requested identification from the
defendant, who produced his state identification card.253  The officer
then ran a warrant check and learned that Harris had an outstanding
warrant for failing to appear in court.5 4  On the basis of this
information, the officer arrested Harris, and an ensuing search revealed
2551drugs and drug paraphernalia.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in a 4-3 decision, ruled that the
warrant check was improper.256 Justice Charles Freeman, writing for the
court, first applied the Gonzalez test to the officer's request for Harris's
identification.257 As in Gonzalez, the court characterized the officer's
simple question as "facially innocuous" and "did not change the
fundamental nature of the stop by converting it into a general inquisition
about past, present and future wrongdoing. 258  Justice Freeman also
noted that the request served to "identify a potential witness" to the
events and provide "a certain level of protection" to the officer and
nonconsensual seizure." Id.
248. Id. at 1039 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
249. People v. Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219 (I11. 2003), vacated sub. nom. Illinois v. Harris, 125 S.
Ct. 1292 (2005).
250. Id. at 229.
251. Id. at 231.
252. Id. at 221.
253. Id. at 222. According to the officer, when a driver was illegally driving, it was his
regular practice to request passengers' identification to determine whether they could be alternate
drivers. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 221-22.
256. Id. at 229 (citing cases in support of the conclusion that retaining the defendant's
identification card and performing a warrant check are outside the scope of a traffic stop).
257. Id. at 226.
258. Id. (pointing to the similarities in both facts and approach in Gonzalez and other Supreme
Court of Illinois decisions).
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driver.259
Unlike Gonzalez, however, the court did not end its inquiry at the
request for identification, but rather, applied the test to the officer's
warrant check.260 First, the court found the warrant check unrelated to
the initial justification for the traffic stop, specifically, the driver's
illegal left turn. 261 Next, the court held that the warrant check was not
justified by any reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing by the defendant.2 62 Then, the court applied both prongs of
the third step in the Gonzalez test.2 63  Under the first prong, the court
examined whether the warrant check improperly prolonged the
detention, but found the record inconclusive on this point.26 4 However,
this was irrelevant, as the warrant check did not satisfy the second
prong, which considered whether the warrant check altered the
fundamental nature of the stop. 265 According to the court, the officer's
warrant check changed a routine traffic stop into a general investigation
about the defendant's past wrongdoing, and thus, the officer improperly
exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. 266
Realizing the controversial nature of its decision, the court
recognized the "tempestuous discourse" among foreign jurisdictions
regarding the propriety of requesting a passenger's identification and
conducting subsequent warrant checks.267 However, the court limited
the case's holding by describing several hypothetical instances in which
an officer's warrant check of a passenger would be proper. 18 First, the
officer could reasonably suspect the passenger of criminal
259. Id. This justification was not offered by the Gonzalez court, and indeed, the court's
description seems to offer an affirmative approval of the officer's request. Id.
260. Id. at 227-28 (referring to warrant check conducted by an officer on the passenger-
defendant during a stop for a traffic violation).
261. Id. at 228.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 228-29. See supra text accompanying note 199 (discussing the third prong of
Gonzalez test).
264. Harris, 802 N.E.2d at 228. Although the officer testified that he "transmitted the driver's
and defendant's information to county dispatch at the same time.... [The officer] did not testify
that the warrant check [performed] on defendant was completed before the check on the driver."
Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 228-29. Alternatively, the State also argued that the evidence recovered from the
defendant should be admitted under the inevitable discovery doctrine because a post-arrest,
inventory search of the vehicle would have uncovered the defendant's drugs anyway. Id. at 230.
However, the court rejected the argument, stating that the chain of events leading to such a
scenario was "simply too tenuous." Id.
267. Id. at 228 (citing numerous state court decisions on both sides of the issue).
268. Id. at 228-29 (listing cases from various states to highlight such instances).
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wrongdoing. 269  Second, the passenger himself may have committed a
traffic violation.270 Third, the passenger's conduct may cause the officer
to fear for his safety.27' Finally, if the passenger consents to drive
because of the driver's arrest, a warrant check may be proper.2 72
Justice Fitzgerald, the author of the Gonzalez opinion, dissented in an
opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Garman. 273 According to Justice
Fitzgerald, the court's decision prevents police from utilizing a basic
law enforcement technique that does not implicate Fourth Amendment
concerns. 274  Once the officer has the passenger's identification, a
warrant check is not "inquisitorial, confrontational, or suggestive of
official interrogation," and does not further intrude on a passenger's
275privacy. In addition, a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of
276privacy in such information, which is a matter of public record.
Moreover, the dissent found it absurd that the majority's opinion left
open the possibility that a driver might challenge a warrant check as
well. 7  Finally, the dissent argued that the majority essentially required
an officer performing a warrant check to testify to a subjective fear for
his safety, despite case law and statistics demonstrating that officer
safety concerns heighten during a vehicle stop.278
269. Id.
270. Id. For example, the passenger may be riding in a car with an open container of alcohol.
Id.
271. Id. at 229. On this point, the court noted that the officer did not testify to any safety
concerns during the traffic stop. Id. at 229-30 n.4. In addition, the court directly addressed the
dissent's argument which focused heavily on the safety rationale for performing warrant checks:
[W]hile we share the anxiety of our dissenting colleagues over the number of officers
killed during traffic stops, we simply cannot allow the understandable emotional
reaction to such numbers to cloud our legal analysis, or ignore, as those in dissent
appear to do, the fact that Officer Reed did not fear for his safety in this case.
Id. at 230 n.4.
272. Id. at 230.
273. Id. at 231 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also wrote a brief dissenting
opinion in which he stated that the court's decision confirmed his "fears" in Gonzalez that the
Gonzalez rule was unworkable. Id. at 235 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 233-34 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that the court's decision
conflicted with previous cases that seemed to uphold an officer's warrant check. Id. at 234
(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 232 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-1 (West 2002) to
assert that "[a] warrant check is simply a computerized retrieval of information in the public
record-information which indicates whether a court has entered a written order commanding the
arrest of a specific person").
277. Id. at 234 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 235 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
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C. Vacation for the Dogs: The Court Restricts Canine Sniffs
The final set of Illinois cases addresses an officer's use of a canine to
sniff for drugs during a traffic stop. The Supreme Court of Illinois
regarded canine sniffs as an impermissible expansion of the scope of a
traffic stop, which led the court to require reasonable suspicion before
an officer could administer a sniff. 7 9 Although the United States
Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with this bright-line rule, the Court
expressly left intact another Illinois decision that indicated numerous
concerns with an officer's use of a canine.28 °
1. People v. Cox: Canine Sniff Invalidated on Several Grounds
In People v. Cox,28' the Supreme Court of Illinois, for the first time,
addressed the use of a canine unit during a traffic stop. In strikingly
powerful language, the court invalidated the officer's use of the canine
unit and signaled that it would closely scrutinize such investigative
techniques in the future.282
In Cox, a police officer stopped the defendant's vehicle for not
having a rear registration light.283 Upon making the stop, the officer
called a deputy and requested a canine unit.284 Fifteen minutes later, the
deputy and canine arrived at the scene, while the officer was writing the
defendant's ticket.2 85 The dog walked around the car and, after it alerted
the officers to the presence of drugs, the officer searched the car and
286found "possible cannabis seeds and residue" on the floor. The
officer's search of the defendant's vehicle revealed a small amount of
cannabis.287 At trial, the court held that the officer had "no reasonable
basis" to justify the canine walk around and therefore granted the
288defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
279. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ill. 2003), vacated sub noa. Illinois v.
Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
280. Caballes I1, 125 S. Ct. at 837 ("[C]onducting a dog sniff would not change the character
of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner,
unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally protected interest in privacy.
Our cases hold that it did not.").
281. People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (111. 2002), cert. denied sub noma. Illinois v. Cox, 539 U.S.
937 (2003).
282. Id. at 281 (stating that the officer in question did not have sufficient facts to draw a
"rational inference" to warrant detention of the defendant's vehicle or the canine search).
283. Id. at 277. A "registration light" is the light that illuminates the rear license plate.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. (revealing less than 2.5 grams of substance containing cannabis).
288. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois, in an opinion by Justice Freeman,
affirmed the trial court's suppression of the evidence, finding the dog
sniff impermissible.2 9  The court first stated its concern with the
duration of the fifteen-minute traffic stop, which should have been
relatively brief. Although the court stated that it was not imposing a
rigid time limit on traffic stops, it noted that the officer "should have
issued a traffic ticket or warning to the defendant expeditiously. Had he
done so, defendant would have left the scene of the traffic stop prior to
the arrival of the canine unit. '29°
The court also specifically focused on Terry's second prong, which
considers the scope of the stop.29' Here, the officer stopped Cox for a
minor traffic violation; however, he had no reason to believe that her
vehicle contained drugs. 92 The officer did not smell or see any drugs,
and Cox did not appear nervous or suspicious.2 93 Thus, the court noted,
"were we to accept the State's contention that the dog-sniff test was
permissible, we would be endorsing a drug-sniff test at every stop for a
traffic violation. 294
Justice Thomas's lengthy dissent criticized the majority on a number
of grounds. 295 First, he stated that the court ruled on an issue different
than the one for which the court granted the appeal.296  Second, he
declared that there was "no factual basis" for the majority's concern
with the length of the stop.297 According to Justice Thomas, the officer
testified that he generally spent an average of "10 to 12 minutes, 15
minutes" writing traffic citations, and that he was in fact still writing the
ticket when the canine unit arrived.298  Thus, Justice Thomas said, the
289. Id. at 281. In justifying the police action, the state argued that the canine unit arrived at
the scene while the officer was still writing the defendant's ticket. Id. at 279. Thus, it appears
that the state was trying to distinguish the case from People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 566
(Ill. 1999), in which the officer's continued detention of the driver was improper.
290. Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 279.
291. Id. at 278-79 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Furthermore, the Terry
standard is codified in the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14
(2002 & West Supp. 2004) ("A police officer, after having identified himself as a peace officer,
may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably
infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed
an offense .. "). See supra note 22 and accompanying text (setting forth this aspect of the Terry
test).
292. Id. at 280.
293. Id. at 280-81.
294. Id. at 280.
295. Id. at 281-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Thomas, the State appealed whether the
dog sniff constituted a "search" under the Illinois Constitution. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 282 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 282 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas further stated that the majority's ruling
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only way for the majority to reach its conclusion was to "determine sua
sponte" that the officer was lying.299 Third, Justice Thomas noted that
the court's decision could not be reconciled with United States Supreme
Court precedent.3 °° For instance, in United States v. Sharpe,3' the
Supreme Court rejected a rigid time limit for traffic stops and
reaffirmed its case-by-case analysis.02 Also, in United States v.
Place, °3 the Court held that a canine sniff of luggage at an airport did
not constitute a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes.3
°4
Conducting his own analysis under federal law, Justice Thomas
concluded that a canine sniff is not a "search," and thus, the sniff of
Cox's vehicle was constitutionally permissible.3"5
2. People v. Caballes: Suspicionless Canine Sniffs Outlawed
The court repeated its strong denouncement of canine sniffs from Cox
in People v. Caballes,3 °6 in which the court clearly held that officers
subtly shifted the burden of proof to the State to show that the stop was not impermissibly
prolonged. Id. at 283 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 283 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 283 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that the court essentially determined that a
traffic stop that exceeds fifteen minutes automatically becomes illegal unless otherwise justified).
301. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
302. Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 283 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686). In
addition, Thomas noted the Court's decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001), permitted an officer to arrest a driver for a minor traffic infraction. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). According to Thomas, this meant that the officer here could have arrested Cox and
then searched incident to arrest, an option police officers would be forced to take if the traffic
stop could take longer than fifteen minutes. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
303. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
304. Id. at 707.
305. Cox, 782 N.E.2d.at 286-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas relied primarily on
the Court's decision in Place. In Place, DEA agents seized an airplane passenger's luggage and
subjected the luggage to a canine sniff to detect the presence of narcotics. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
The Court held that the sniff was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 707. The Court described the dog sniff as follows:
A "canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require
opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would
remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through
the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained
through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search.
Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the
contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure
also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.
Id.
306. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202 (111. 2003), vacated sub nom. Illinois v. Caballes, 125
S. Ct. 834 (2005).
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need reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a canine sniff
during a routine traffic stop.3 °7 In Caballes, a state trooper witnessed
the defendant speeding and reported the traffic stop to the radio
dispatcher.3 °8 Another state trooper, also a member of the state drug
interdiction team, overheard the radio dispatch and proceeded to meet
the officer at the scene to conduct a canine sniff of the stopped
vehicle. 3°9 As the first state trooper approached Caballes's car, he
observed in the car an atlas, an open ashtray, two suits hanging in the
back seat, and he smelled air freshener.310 The officer told the defendant
that he was only going to give him a warning ticket, and then he called
the dispatcher to verify the defendant's information and perform a
warrant check.31'
While the trooper awaited the results of the check, he asked the
defendant "where he was going and why he was 'dressed up."' 3 12 The
defendant stated that he was moving from Las Vegas to Chicago and
that he was accustomed to dressing up since he was a salesman.33 The
officer found it unusual that the defendant acted nervous, even after he
learned he would receive only a warning ticket.314 The officer then
requested permission to search the car, which the defendant refused.315
While the officer wrote the warning ticket, the drug interdiction trooper
arrived and began walking around the defendant's vehicle.31 6 The dog
alerted the officer to the presence of drugs, and a subsequent search of
the vehicle uncovered marijuana." 7
In a brief opinion by Justice Thomas Kilbride, the court held that the
canine sniff unjustifiably exceeded the scope of the traffic stop.31  The
court held that, under Cox, an officer needed reasonable and articulable
suspicion to conduct a canine sniff during a traffic stop.319 However, in
this case, the officer's observations did not amount to reasonable
suspicion.120 First, the lack of visible luggage in the car, despite moving
307. Id. at 205.
308. Id. at 203 (traveling six miles per hour above the speed limit).
309. Id. (proceeding to the scene without the request of the other officer).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 205.
319. Id. at204 .
320. Id.
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across the country, could be "readily explained" because his property
could have been in the trunk or shipped separately.32' Second, the
defendant's air freshener could have been used to mask odors besides
drugs, such as cigarettes.322  Third, the fact that the defendant wore
business attire did not suggest involvement in criminal activity.323
Finally, the defendant's apparent nervousness alone did not engender
reasonable suspicion.324 Even when viewing these factors together, the
court described them as "nothing more than a vague hunch" that the
defendant was involved in criminal wrongdoing.325 Therefore, the
officer improperly exceeded the scope of the traffic stop.
326
As in Cox, Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justices Fitzgerald
and Garman.327 Justice Thomas stated that he could not apply Cox as a
matter of stare decisis because the majority's decision was "wholly
incompatible" with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment.328  According to Justice Thomas, Cox's
discussion of the canine sniff was dicta in that case, but it had now
become the law in Illinois.329 Citing extended passages from his Cox
dissent, Justice Thomas again decided that the dog sniff was not a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus, found
the officer's conduct proper.33
The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision, reversed the
decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois. 3  In its brief decision, the
Court aimed to answer the "narrow" question, "[w]hether the Fourth
Amendment requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using
a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic
stop.''332 Thus, the Court assumed, for the purposes of its decision, that
the dog sniff of the defendant's car was not justified by any suspicion of
wrongdoing and that all other aspects of the traffic stop were proper.
3 1
321. Id. at 205.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 205-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 205 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 206-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
331. Caballes 11, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court,
and Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
participate in the decision.
332. Id. at 837.
333. Id.
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The Court noted the Supreme Court of Illinois' decision in Cox and
interpreted that case-with apparent approval-to forbid a dog sniff
where the traffic stop was already unreasonably prolonged.334 However,
the Court disagreed with the Supreme Court of Illinois over whether the
dog sniff in the current case impermissibly changed the nature of the
traffic stop.33 5 According to the Court, "conducting a dog sniff would
not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception
and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff
itself infringed [Caballes's] constitutionally protected interest in
privacy." '336 In examining the privacy interest, the Court summarily
rejected the defendant's arguments concerning the fallibility of the dogs
and looked almost exclusively to its decision in Place, in which it stated
that a dog sniff is sui generis. 37 Because a dog's alert reveals limited
information, namely the presence or absence of illegal drugs, its use by
police does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.338 Similarly, in
this case, a dog sniff conducted during a legitimate traffic stop does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.339
In a dissent, Justice David Souter called for a re-examination of the
assumptions that resulted in the Court's decision in Place.340 Noting the
dogs' high error rates, Justice Souter argued that a dog falsely alerting
to the presence of drugs could lead to the disclosure of intimate details
and is therefore a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.341 Because
the search at issue was not justified by any suspicion of wrongdoing, it
342
was "unreasonable" and, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a dissenting opinion joined by
Justice Souter, criticized the majority for wholly abandoning the Terry
framework used to analyze traffic stops. 343 Like the Supreme Court of
Illinois, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the drug sniff impermissibly
broadened the scope of the initial stop:
The stop becomes broader, more adversarial, and (in at least some
cases) longer. Caballes-who, as far as Troopers Gillette and Graham
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 837-38 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) ("We are aware of
no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure.")).
338. Id. at 838.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 839 (Souter, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 839-40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 841 (Souter, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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knew, was guilty solely of driving six miles per hour over the speed
limit-was exposed to the embarrassment and intimidation of being
investigated, on a public thoroughfare for drugs.'
Finally, Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that the majority's
decision would permit an expansion of police use of drug-sniffing dogs
beyond traffic stops, such as using the dogs to sniff along parked cars or
at traffic lights.345
IV. ANALYSIS OF ILLINOIS' APPROACH
Underlying the Supreme Court of Illinois' recent cases involving
routine traffic stops is the idea that the second prong of the Terry test,
which concerns the scope of the detention, should apply in a meaningful
way to prevent officers from using a lawful stop for a traffic infraction
to conduct a broad investigation without suspicion of wrongdoing.
Despite the United States Supreme Court's decision in Caballes, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois will likely have an enormous
impact in curbing aggressive police tactics during traffic stops.
A. Consensual Encounters and Searches
At first glance, the facts in Brownlee3 46 appear strikingly similar to
the facts in Robinette,347 the leading United States Supreme Court
consensual search case. Both defendants, stopped for traffic violations,
later gave consent to search the vehicle. 348 In fact, the Illinois Appellate
Court initially applied the Robinette decision to the case and decided
against the defendant in Brownlee, finding simply that there was no
duty to inform the driver that he was free to leave. 49 The Supreme
Court of Illinois could have reasonably affirmed on this basis.
However, the Supreme Court of Illinois found a way to distinguish the
two cases, primarily based upon the officer's assertion that he "paused
for a couple minutes" before asking for consent. 30  The court
interpreted this pause as a continued detention after the traffic stop had
concluded and before the officers asked for consent to search.35'
344. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 845-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
346. People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. 1999). See supra notes 134-156 and
accompanying text (discussing Brownlee in detail).
347. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text
(discussing Robinette in detail).
348. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36; Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d at 559.
349. People v. Brownlee, 674 N.E.2d 503, 507 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1996).
350. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d at 564.
351. Id. at 564-65.
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Comparing the two cases, the court stated, "Certainly Robinette does
not stand for the proposition that, following the conclusion of lawful
traffic stop, officers may detain a vehicle without reasonable suspicion
of any illegal activity and for any amount of time, so long as they
ultimately request and obtain permission to search the car.' 351  Thus,
without specifically contradicting recent United States Supreme Court
authority, the court nonetheless reached a more protective result.
353
The court then proceeded to decide the case based on the State's
argument that the post-traffic stop encounter was consensual.354  In
doing so, the court applied the Mendenhall "free to leave" standard by
focusing on the officers' "show of authority. 355  The officers in
Brownlee demonstrated a show of authority when they remained on
either side of the car and "stood there, saying nothing., 356  Quite
logically, the court also noted that if the motorist drove away, "the two
officers would soon be in hot pursuit.,,35' The court also looked at the
driver's subjective reaction-asking whether he had a choice in the
matter-as evidence.358 Based on these factors, the court concluded that
a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, and therefore the
driver and passengers were seized.359
The court applied these same factors in a similarly restrictive way in
Gherna and Bunch.36 °  In Gherna, the court seriously examined the
circumstances surrounding the encounter, namely the facts that the
officers wore badges and were fully equipped,36' the position of the
officers and their bikes next to the car doors, and "the request to
examine the bottle of beer on the heels of other questioning. 362 In view
352. Id. at 563.
353. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40 (rejecting the Ohio Supreme Court's bright line rule
requiring officers to inform citizens of their right to refuse consent in order for the consent to be
voluntary).
354. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d at 566.
355. Id. at 564.
356. Id. at 565-66.
357. Id. at 566.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1032 (Ill. 2003); People v. Ghema, 784 N.E.2d 799,
808-09 (11. 2003).
361. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d at 808. The State had argued that the officers were "less
threatening" because they were on bike patrol and wore short-sleeved shirts and short trousers.
Id. at 807-08. However, these facts did not "diminish their apparent authority as law
enforcement personnel." Id. at 808.
362. Id. at 808. The court determined that the dividing point between the investigatory stop
and the post-stop encounter was when the officer asked the defendant to hand him the bottle of
beer. Id. However, at that point, it seems that the officer was still in the process of confirming or
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of these factors, the court held that a reasonable person would have felt
compelled to submit to the officer's authority and would not have felt
free to leave.363 In Bunch, the positioning of the officer again was
critical to determining that there was a show of authority that compelled
a person to remain.364 There, the court observed that after the decision
to tow the car, the officer (1) ordered Bunch to stand at the vehicle's
rear next to the arrested driver, (2) stood a foot in front of Bunch's face,
(3) shined his flashlight on Bunch, and (4) asked Bunch's name and
where he was coming from. 365  Based on these four facts, the court
found that the officer's show of authority would have caused a
reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave.366
In applying the "free to leave" test, the court seems to have abolished
distinctions between detentions of the driver and passengers during a
traffic stop. In Gonzalez, the state expressly contended that the officer's
request for the passenger's identification represented an act of
"community caretaking," and therefore was consensual.367 Justice
Thomas, concurring, applied the Bostick test, which is appropriate
whenever a person's detention stems from a factor independent of
police conduct. 368 A passenger who remains because the police have
stopped his driver arguably fits this test.369  The majority, however,
rejected this argument because the state did not describe how the
officer's request for the passenger's identification served any public-
safety function. 370  Thus, in Gonzalez, Bunch, and Brownlee, the fact
that the defendants were passengers seemed to have no bearing on the
court's holdings regarding whether they consented to the encounter.37'
Overall, the Supreme Court of Illinois has applied the "free to leave"
test much more rigorously than the United States Supreme Court has
applied it. 372 For instance, in United States v. Drayton,3 73 three plain-
dispelling his suspicions of underage drinking. When he learned that the beer was unopened, his
suspicions were dispelled, and the purpose of his stop was complete.
363. Id.
364. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d at 1032.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 263-64 (11. 2003).
368. Id. at 272 (Thomas, J., concurring).
369. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring); Bunch, 796 N.E.2d at 1036 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
370. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 263-64.
371. The driver-passenger distinction also arose in People v. Harris, when the court suggested
that the majority would hold warrant checks of drivers unconstitutional. People v. Harris, 802
N.E.2d 219, 234 (I11. 2003) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), vacated sub. nom. Illinois v. Harris, 125 S.
Ct. 1292 (2005). See infra notes 439-45 and accompanying text (discussing Harris in further
detail).
372. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (applying a lenient standard to what
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clothed police officers displaying badges conducted a bus sweep for
drugs. One officer moved to the back of the bus, one remained kneeling
in the driver's seat, and the third officer walked through the aisle,
speaking with the passengers and asking to search their luggage. In its
decision, holding that an encounter between a passenger and officer was
consensual, the Court placed a great deal of weight on the simple facts
that the officer did not brandish a weapon and that he questioned the bus
passengers "in a polite, quiet voice. '37 4 Short of handcuffing a citizen,375
the United States Supreme Court's decisions do not suggest a realistic
point at which the encounter is no longer consensual.376 In contrast, the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois take into consideration the
constitutes a seizure). In Delgado, INS officers visited a factory to survey for illegal immigrants.
Id. at 212. Several agents stood near the buildings' exits while several others-who were armed,
displayed badges, and carried walkie-talkies-walked through the factory and questioned
employees. Id. In its decision, holding that an encounter between an agent and employee was
consensual, the Court stated that the questioning, "given its obvious purpose, could hardly result
in a reasonable fear that [the employees] were not free to continue working or to move about the
factory." Id. at 220-21. The Court also stated that the "obvious purpose" for the agents posted at
the exits was not to prevent the employees from leaving, but rather to ensure that all employees
were questioned. Id. at 218. In a partial dissent, Justice William Brennan explained that the
questioning was systematically conducted by fifteen to twenty-five INS agents who, in fact,
handcuffed and detained persons they suspected to be illegal aliens. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
373. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
374. Id. at 203-04.
375. In Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 627 (2003), the United States Supreme Court reversed
a Texas court's decision involving a seventeen-year-old boy who was awakened by three police
officers at 3:00 am, handcuffed, and-wearing only boxer shorts and a T-shirt-was driven from
his home to police headquarters. The Texas Court of Appeals, in considering whether the boy
was under arrest at the time he was handcuffed, incredibly held that the boy was not under arrest.
Kaupp v. State, No. 14-00-00128-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3732, *8-9 (Tex. Ct. App. June 7,
2001). In its decision, the court appeared to rely on the same factors noted by the Court in
Drayton:
[A]fter being allowed into appellant's house by his father and led to appellant's
bedroom, Detective Pinkins identified himself to appellant and told him they "need to
go and talk," to which appellant replied "Okay." Although Pinkins's weapon was
visible, neither he nor any of the other officers had their guns drawn. There was no
evidence of any threat, either express or implied, that appellant would be forcibly taken
to the station for questioning.
Id.
The United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that the boy was indeed under
arrest, stating that "Pinkins offered Kaupp no choice, and a group of police officers rousing an
adolescent out of bed in the middle of the night with the words 'we need to go and talk' presents
no option but 'to go."' Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 631. Though the Texas court's decision was
unmistakably incorrect, it does illustrate the deficiencies of the Drayton factors in determining
whether an encounter is truly consensual.
376. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 209-10 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing various factual
patterns in which police questioning of citizens become decreasingly consensual). See also
LaFave, supra note 115, at 1900 (noting that the Court, in Robinette, avoids the issue).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 36
reality of traffic stops: a driver, stopped on the side of the road while
being questioned by a police officer, would most likely not feel free to
leave.377
In addition, Brownlee and Gherna make the police practice of
requesting consensual searches more difficult to justify. The Supreme
Court of Illinois will not allow police to continue encounters with
citizens after the purpose of the stop has concluded. Indeed, the court
left little leeway to argue that such an encounter would be consensual,
in part, due to its emphasis on the positions of the officers surrounding
the vehicle.3 78  According to the court, such a position inherently
constitutes a lawful show of authority from which a reasonable person
would not feel free to leave. 379 Thus, an officer's continued detention of
the motorist essentially nullifies a later request for consent to search the
vehicle.
Indeed, lower court decisions applying the Brownlee cases to
allegedly consensual encounters support this reading of the Supreme
Court of Illinois' decisions.38°  Perhaps the most important of these
cases is People v. Goeking,381 in which the Appellate Court of Illinois
expressly stated that consensual encounters following a traffic stop
would be rare after Brownlee. 82 In Goeking, an officer asked a driver to
377. See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Ohio 1995) (analyzing when legal detention
ends and a consensual encounter begins); supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. For a lower
court opinion finding a show of authority, see People v. Dent, 797 N.E.2d 200, 210-11 (111. App.
Ct. 5th Dist. 2003) (finding a show of authority where the defendant, walking into a residence,
heard an instruction to "wait a minute" and then saw that "seven to nine uniformed police officers
were emerging from five vehicles arriving in tandem" and that the officers were surrounding him
on three sides).
378. People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1032 (Ill. 2003); People v. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d 799,
808 (Ill. 2003); People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 565-66 (Ill. 1999).
379. Id. at 566 ("A reasonable person in this driver's situation would likely conclude that, if
he or she drove away, then the two officers would soon be in hot pursuit.").
380. See, e.g., People v. Granados, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2002)
(holding that, after officers verified a driver's license and registration during a roadside check, an
officer saw cased shotguns in the bed of the driver's pickup truck, the officer's second detention
of the driver to verify his license to own a firearm was improper); People v. Robinson, 748
N.E.2d 739, 741-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist 2001) (ruling that continued detention was improper
where officer asked for consent to search a vehicle after: (1) the officer issued written warnings
for a covered registration sticker and an object hanging on the rearview mirror; and (2) driver's
passing of a field sobriety test dispelled the officer's suspicions of drunk driving); People v.
Ortiz, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1014-21 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2000) (holding continued detention
improper where officer stopped a motorist for speeding, ran a warrant and criminal history check,
returned the licenses, issued a warning ticket, and then asked for and received consent to ask a
few questions, but was refused consent to search the vehicle).
381. People v. Goeking, 780 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2002).
382. Id. at 831 ("It is difficult to imagine many cases in which a motorist would voluntarily
remain at the scene of a traffic stop to engage the officer in casual conversation.").
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exit her car to determine whether she was intoxicated.383 After
concluding that she was not intoxicated, the officer issued a verbal
warning and informed the driver that she was "free to go. '384 As the
driver returned to her car, the officer asked whether she had any
"knives, guns, drugs, dead bodies, grenades, rocket launchers, anything
that shouldn't be in the vehicle. 3 85 The Appellate Court of Illinois for
the Second District found that, although the officer told the driver she
was free to leave, he immediately questioned her about illegal items in
her car.38 ' This "at best sent defendant mixed signals," and the court
upheld the trial court's finding that a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave in that situation.387 Thus, Goeking demonstrates that
even an oral "free-to-leave" announcement after the conclusion of the
traffic stop will not justify a continued encounter with a motorist, nor
will it constitute a consensual search.388
B. The Emergence and Extension of the Gonzalez Standard
When the Supreme Court of Illinois in Gonzalez addressed the limits
to police questioning during routine traffic stops, it did so without the
benefit of clear guidance from the United States Supreme Court, which
389has not directly ruled on the issue. Moreover, as Justice Thomas
stated, the majority opinion gave little guidance as to how and when the
Gonzalez test3 90 should apply in the future.39' However, a composite of
Gonzalez, Harris, and Bunch provides a clearer picture of how the court
views unrelated questioning during traffic stops. More importantly,
though, the court's decision in Harris demonstrates that the Gonzalez
inquiry applies to other expansions of the scope of traffic stops and
severely restricts police officers' investigations during such stops.
383. Id. at 830.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See also People v. Roberts, 813 N.E.2d 748, 753-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004)
(finding warrant check invalid despite officer's informing defendant he was free to leave); People
v. Hall, 814 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2004) (finding officer's questioning of
defendant invalid despite informing defendant he was free to leave).
389. Vazquez, supra note 99, at 225 (stating that the United States Supreme Court should
review the issue).
390. See People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 269-70 (Ill. 2003) (discussing that if a question
is not reasonably related to the purpose of a stop and not justified by reasonable and articulable
suspicion, the question is proper only if it did not impermissibly prolong the detention or change
the fundamental nature of the stop).
391. Id. at 273 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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1. The Limits of Questioning
Although officers asked similar questions in Gonzalez, Harris, and
Bunch, the court found the questioning improper only in Bunch.392 In
Gonzalez and Harris, an officer asked the vehicle's passenger for
identification.393  In Bunch, an officer asked the passenger what his
name was and where he was coming from.394 As the court stated
without analysis, neither question reasonably related to the traffic
violation that prompted the initial stop.395 In addition, neither question
was independently supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
wrongdoing.396
The court's split decision cases arise from its analysis in the third step
of the inquiry: whether the question prolongs the detention or alters the
fundamental nature of the stop. The requests for identification in
Gonzalez and Harris did not prolong the stop because the request came
during the course of the traffic stop. 9 7 Also, the questions did not alter
the fundamental nature of the stop because they were "facially
innocuous"'3 98 and allowed the officer to identify a witness to the traffic
violation.3 99
Similarly, in Bunch, the officer asked the defendant's name and
where he was coming from-"facially innocuous questions" that did not
fundamentally change the nature of the stop.4°°  As Justice Thomas
pointed out in his dissent, the questions could have related to Bunch's
travel plans, since he became a stranded passenger once the officer
decided to tow the car.40' The officer's questions then could be justified
as "an objective concern any officer would have for a passenger who
might be left stranded as a result of the driver's arrest."4 2
392. People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1032-33 (I1. 2003).
393. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 262; People v. Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219, 222 (Il1. 2003), vacated
sub. nom. Illinois v. Harris, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005).
394. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d at 1027.
395. Id. at 1030; Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 270.
396. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d at 1030; Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 270.
397. Id.; Harris, 802 N.E.2d at 226.
398. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 270; Harris, 802 N.E.2d at 226.
399. Id. In Gonzalez, the court stated that the officer's "simple" request did not "suggest
official interrogation" or "increase the confrontational nature of the encounter." Gonzalez, 789
N.E.2d at 270. However, it is not clear how the level of interrogation relates to the fundamental
nature of a traffic stop, which is typically a brief encounter to address a traffic violation through a
citation or warning. The more cogent reasoning is contained in Harris.
400. Although the court was silent on this prong of the inquiry, the comparison between
Bunch and Gonzalez can be fairly made.
401. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d at 1038 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
402. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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However, the key difference between the two situations is that the
officer in Bunch asked the questions after the purpose for the stop had
concluded.4 3 When the officer asked Bunch the questions, the officer
had already decided to arrest the driver and have the car towed.4°4 This
concluded the officer's handling of the traffic violations, and the
purpose for the initial traffic stop was complete.45  Thus, the officer's
continued questioning prolonged Bunch's detention beyond the
completion of the purpose of the stop.
4 0 6
The rule that emerges from these three cases is that asking a
passenger facially innocuous questions, such as his identity, during a
traffic stop has a legitimate purpose and is most certainly permissible.
Once the purpose of the traffic stop has concluded, however, any further
questioning, no matter how simple and innocuous, prolongs the
detention and is therefore improper.4 7 Moreover, these cases clearly
indicate that the "purpose" of the traffic stop is not to broadly
investigate criminality, but rather to address the traffic violation that the
officer witnessed.48
Illinois appellate courts have strictly construed the Gonzalez rule to
severely limit investigations into drug activity or other criminal
wrongdoing during traffic stops. For instance, a number of courts have
easily found an officer's questioning to have altered the nature of the
stop or prolonged the stop when the officer asked whether a motorist
had any illegal items, including guns, drugs, or alcohol in the vehicle,
and subsequently requested consent to search the vehicle.4 °9 In these
403. Id. at 1031.
404. Id. at 1027.
405. Id. at 1031.
406. Id.
407. The court did seem to agree with the trial court's statement that there would be some
legitimate reasons to have a conversation with a passenger in a similar situation, "including
explaining to him the reason for the arrest and determining if defendant could be an alternative
driver." Id. at 1030. Nonetheless, if the officer was not permitted to ask Bunch his name and
place of departure, it is hard to imagine what questions would have been legitimate. Id.
408. See People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 280 (I11. 2002) (noting that the officer should have
issued a warning or citation more expeditiously), cert. denied sub nom. Illinois v. Cox, 539 U.S.
937 (2003).
409. See People v. Hall, 814 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2004) (ruling that
officer's questions and request to search the vehicle exceeded the scope of Terry because they
followed the officers' completion of the traffic stop and the defendant was told he was free to go),
appeal denied, 824 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. 2004); People v. Lomas, 812 N.E.2d 39, 46 (I11. App. Ct. 5th
Dist. 2004) (stating that unless the officers possess or subsequently develop reasonable,
articulable suspicions of criminal activity, they must attend to the business of charging a traffic
offense and confine their investigation to the minimal inquiries attendant to it); People v. Jones,
806 N.E.2d 722, 726 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2004) (noting that there was simply no reason for the
officer to return to the vehicle with questions about guns or drugs instead of a completed traffic
2005]
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cases, the courts have often noted that the officer's questions seemed
calculated to elicit incriminating responses or otherwise resembled a
"fishing expedition."
410
In at least two cases, however, lower courts applying Gonzalez have
upheld questioning related to drug activity. First, in People v.
Reatherford,41 ' an officer stopped a defendant for weaving across lanes
of traffic and changing lanes without signaling. 412 The officer also knew
from a credible informant that the defendant had been observed
purchasing the ingredients for methamphetamine and saw the
ingredients in the defendant's truck during the stop.4 3  Therefore, the
Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District held that the officer
had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity rendering it appropriate to
414ask where the defendant was coming from and where he was going.
In People v. Moore,4 5 the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second
District also held that an officer's questions were appropriate because
the questions were reasonably related to the initial purpose of the traffic
stop.41 6 In Moore, an officer stopped the defendant for driving on the
ticket after the defendant provided adequate identification and explained his reason for driving on
the shoulder), appeal denied, 823 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. 2004); People v. Marungo, 800 N.E.2d 562,
568 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2003) (determining that the question to search not only prolonged any
legitimate detention of the car to investigate a traffic violation, but also changed the fundamental
nature of the encounter); see also People v. Staple, 803 N.E.2d 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004)
(analyzing a factual pattern similar to Bunch where the defendant was a passenger who was
questioned after the conclusion of the traffic stop).
410. For instance, in People v. Marungo, 800 N.E.2d at 564, an officer witnessed the
defendant's vehicle turn without signaling 100 feet from an intersection. Before the officers had
an opportunity to activate their lights and pull the car over, the defendant had parked his car in a
driveway in an area known for gang activity, walked to a residence about four houses away,
looked at the officers, stood at the residence for a moment, and then returned to his car. Id. An
officer then approached the defendant and rather than follow the protocol of a typical stop, asked
him questions about what he was doing, and asked for consent to search his vehicle. Id. The
Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District held that the officer's questions were not
justified by reasonable suspicion or any other prong of the Gonzalez test. Id. at 568. In
addressing the officer's conduct, the court was troubled by the pretextual nature of the stop, as
evidenced by the officer's delay in writing the ticket until after the defendant had arrived at the
police station. Id. at 569. The court further stated, "It is clear that [the officer] was not interested
in treating the encounter as a traffic stop.... [His] interest in searching the car, and his
conversation with defendant about being in a gang-related neighborhood, showed that his intent
[was] to conduct a criminal investigation." Id. at 568-69.
411. People v. Reatherford, 802 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003), appeal denied, 809
N.E.2d 1291 (I11. 2004).
412. Id. at 348.
413. Id. at 350.
414. Id.
415. People v. Moore, 792 N.E.2d 836 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2003).
416. Id. at 842.
Curbing Aggressive Police Tactics
wrong side of the road at a high rate of speed. 417  The defendant,
"nervous and shaking" when approached by the officer, was unable to
produce identification. 4 1  According to the court, these facts, in
connection with the large number of passengers in the vehicle (four),
meant that the officer could reasonably "suspect that the defendant may
have been under the influence of a controlled substance and/or alcohol,
or that other criminal activity may have been in progress., 419 Thus, the
officer's questioning about the presence of contraband and request to
search the vehicle related to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place.420  The court's reasoning in Moore is
questionable in some respects, because it interprets the purpose of a stop
more broadly than the initial traffic violation. 42' Furthermore, the
decision essentially creates a per se rule permitting officers to
investigate drug activity in the course of traffic stops involving erratic
driving, which contradicts the Supreme Court of Illinois' more stringent
422
requirements for reasonable suspicion.
2. Warrant and Criminal History Checks
Although the United States Supreme Court vacated the Supreme
Court of Illinois' decision in Harris, it simply remanded for
reconsideration in light of its decision in Caballes.423 Because Harris
was based on an independent application of the Gonzalez test-and not
on Caballes-it appears that the decision should be reaffirmed in the
Supreme Court of Illinois. On the other hand, the United States Court
may be suggesting that warrant checks, like canine sniffs, are sui
generis and therefore do not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns at
all. In that case, the United States Supreme Court will be forced to step
into the fray once again and reverse an Illinois decision.
In its decision in Harris, the Supreme Court of Illinois indicated,
first, that the court would not only apply its Gonzalez inquiry to police
questioning, but also to other expansions of the scope of a traffic stop.424
417. Id. at 841.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 841-42.
420. Id. at 842.
421. See supra notes 409-10 and accompanying text (clarifying the appropriate contours of an
officer's investigation pursuant to a routine traffic stop).
422. See People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202 (I11. 2003) (concluding that the officer's
numerous observations did not amount to a reasonable suspicion of drug activity), vacated sub
nom. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005); see also supra notes 318-26 and accompanying
text (discussing the specific facts that the court held failed to justify a reasonable suspicion).
423. Illinois v. Harris, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005).
424. People v. Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219, 229 (I11. 2003), vacated sub nom. Illinois v. Harris,
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More importantly, the court's strongly-worded analysis seemingly
makes it difficult for a police officer to justify any further investigation
beyond the limited purpose of the traffic stop.
Both the Harris majority and the dissent agreed that, under Gonzalez,
the warrant check did not reasonably relate to the purpose of the stop,
which was to issue a citation for the driver's illegal left turn.4 25  In
addition, all of the justices agreed that no reasonable suspicion that the
passenger was involved in criminal wrongdoing justified the warrant
check.426  Under the third Gonzalez inquiry, the majority could not
determine whether the warrant check of the passenger impermissibly
prolonged the stop.427  However, the members of the court bitterly
disagreed over whether the check altered the fundamental nature of the
stop. 428  The Harris majority simply stated that the warrant check
transformed the nature of the traffic stop into "an investigation of past
wrongdoing by defendant., 429 The dissent, on the other hand-referring
to the original language from Gonzalez, which prohibited "a general
inquisition about past, present and future wrongdoing" 430 -did not
believe that a computerized warrant check constituted a general
inquisition.431
This conflict within the court is not easy to resolve. On one hand,
many courts have included warrant checks among the permissible
inquiries available during a routine traffic stop. For example, in
Michigan v. Summers,432 the United States Supreme Court noted that,
during a Terry stop, an officer could utilize several investigative
techniques, including communicating with others to "determine whether
125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005).
425. Id. at 228; Id. at 234 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Justice Fitzgerald correctly noted that a
warrant check will "rarely, if ever, relate to the purpose of a routine traffic stop-issuing a
warning or citation for an observed traffic violation." Id. at 234 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
426. Id. at 227-28; Id. at 234 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
427. Id. at 228 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). The officer conducted a warrant check of both the
driver and the passenger at the same time. Id. at 223 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). However, the
officer did not testify as to whose results were received first. Id. at 228 (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting). With respect to this fact, the majority opinion stated: "The warrant check performed
on defendant could well have lengthened the duration of the detention if the officer had to wait
for the results of the warrant check." Id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). This suggests that if the
officer had to wait at all for the results of the warrant check, the detention would have been
impermissibly prolonged. Thus, the court seems to be strictly construing the rule against
prolonged detentions.
428. Id. at 228; Id. at 233-34 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
429. Harris, 802 N.E.2d at 228.
430. Id. at 233 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 269
(Ill. 2003)) (emphasis added).
431. Id. at 233-34 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
432. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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a person of that identity is otherwise wanted. 4 33 In addition, Justice
Freeman, in his Cox opinion, stated that an officer "may perform some
initial inquiries, check the driver's license, and conduct a speedy
warrant check. ' 43 4  Sweeping statements such as these suggest that
warrant checks do not impermissibly broaden the scope of traffic stops.
Yet, many courts ruling on the issue have confronted only factual
situations involving warrant checks of a driver or warrant checks of
passengers independently justified by reasonable suspicion or a similar
rationale. Few cases address a suspicionless warrant check of a
passenger. According to Gonzalez, then, a "general inquisition" about a
passenger's possible wrongdoing is improper.435 Justice Fitzgerald
stated that the non-intrusive warrant check "cannot reasonably be
deemed" a general inquisition. 436  For Justice Fitzgerald, the term
"inquisition" seems to connote an overly harsh and intrusive
interrogation from the motorist's point of view.437  However, the
Gonzalez inquiry, formulated to restrict the scope of an investigatory
stop, should properly focus on the officer's conduct.43 8 A more natural
reading of "inquisition" yields simply an "inquiry" or "investigation."
The officer's conduct in Harris indeed encompassed a general
investigation into any wrongdoing committed by the passenger. To
illustrate, if the officer had asked the passenger directly whether he was
evading the judicial process, this would clearly be an investigation into
any past criminality. This is essentially the same as transmitting the
passenger's information to a police dispatcher who makes a similar
determination. Therefore, the warrant check on the passenger altered
the fundamental nature of the stop and was improper.
The Harris majority's strict interpretation of the Gonzalez inquiry to
invalidate even "one of the most basic law enforcement techniques"
calls other investigative techniques into question. As the dissent noted
with harsh criticism, the court's unqualified decision seems to prohibit
warrant checks of drivers as well.439  The court's decisions have not
433. Id. at 701 n.12 (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 9.2).
434. People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 279 (Ill. 2002) (citing a series of Illinois appellate court
decisions), cert. denied sub nom. Illinois v. Cox, 539 U.S. 937 (2003). Justice Fitzgerald cited
this statement in his Harris dissent. Harris, 802 N.E.2d at 234 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
435. People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ill. 2003).
436. Harris, 802 N.E.2d at 234 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
437. Perhaps Justice Fitzgerald was equating "inquisition" with an intrusive inquiry
resembling the infamous thirteenth century Spanish Inquisition.
438. The Gonzalez test examines whether an officer's inquiry is related to the purpose of the
stop, is justified by reasonable suspicion, prolongs the detention, or alters the nature of the stop.
Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 270.
439. Harris, 802 N.E.2d at 234 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
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made any express distinctions between drivers and passengers in the
context of traffic stops." 0 Under the Harris rationale, it is improbable
that a warrant check of a driver would "directly relate[]" to the narrow
purpose of a traffic stop, to investigate a traffic violation. 441 Also, an
"investigation into past wrongdoing" certainly alters the fundamental
nature of a stop.442
Resolution of the issue ultimately may hinge on two parts of the
Gonzalez inquiry. First, an officer who conducts a warrant check after
verifying license and registration information may impermissibly
prolong the detention.443 On the other hand, if a single search reveals
information concerning the driver's license, registration, and possible
outstanding warrants, it is difficult to argue that the detention was
prolonged in any way.
In addition, the answer may depend on the type of information stored
in the police department's database. Nonetheless, the warrant check of
a driver may be justified under Gonzalez if an officer has reasonable
suspicion. It is less clear whether the driver's commission of a traffic
infraction provides reasonable suspicion sufficient to conduct a warrant
check. For instance, upon being stopped a driver may produce, in lieu
of a driver's license, a traffic ticket indicating that a court date has
passed. This may generate reasonable suspicion that the driver did not
attend that court date and therefore violated the law. The court's
opinion, though, suggests that officers must have independent
reasonable suspicion of other criminal wrongdoing." 4 Thus, a warrant
check of a driver seems to fail the Gonzalez test. Also, when
considering the court's restrictive tone and generally broad language, a
challenge to a warrant check of a driver would likely be sustained."5
Although the court's decision in Harris leaves the police with fewer
investigative techniques at their disposal, the decision does not render
440. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 263-64 (rejecting the state's argument that the
officer's encounter with the vehicle's passenger did not implicate the Fourth Amendment).
441. Id. at 227.
442. Id. at 228.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 227-28. The court referred to reasonable suspicion that the passenger "had
committed or was about to commit a crime." Id. at 227. This suggests that an independent
"crime" is required to form the basis of reasonable suspicion.
445. An argument for permitting warrant checks of drivers relates to the officer's safety
concerns. As the dissent noted, "Officer safety is always at issue during a vehicle stop." Id. at
234 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). However, in Harris, the court emphasized the fact that the officer
there did not testify to any safety concerns, and therefore, it was irrelevant in the case. Id. at 229
n.4. Also, the court's statement that a different set of circumstances could yield a different result
further suggests that safety concerns will be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the
degree of safety concerns. Id.
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police powerless. For instance, as one appellate court justice has noted,
"Harris is an invitation for officers to jot down the license holder's
name or memorize it and run a warrant check after the traffic stop has
concluded and the vehicle has departed." 4 6 Indeed, because the driver
would not be detained while the officer is conducting the warrant check,
it is difficult to argue that the Fourth Amendment is implicated by the
officer's actions. However, until the motorist has departed, any
computer checks beyond a license and registration check of the driver
during a traffic stop probably will be deemed improper in Illinois
courts . 7
C. Canine Sniffs and Caballes
If the United States Supreme Court had not granted certiorari in
Caballes, the practice of conducting dog sniffs during traffic stops
would have been virtually eliminated in Illinois. The Supreme Court of
Illinois, using the Gonzalez test, concluded that dog sniffs altered the
fundamental nature of traffic stops and therefore invariably required
reasonable suspicion. 448  More importantly, the Supreme Court of
Illinois' decision indicated that officers would not be able to rely on
weak facts and tenuous inferences to conjure up the requisite level of
suspicion.449  In evaluating the evidence known to the officers in
Caballes, the Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that the air freshener,
the lack of visible luggage, and the driver's nervousness amounted to
"nothing more than a vague hunch."' 0
The reversal of the Supreme Court of Illinois' decision in Caballes
clearly alters Illinois law with respect to dog sniffs. Under the United
States Supreme Court's decision, an officer conducting a routine traffic
446. People v. Roberts, 813 N.E.2d 748, 754 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004) (Knecht, P.J.,
concurring). See also People v. Grove, 792 N.E.2d 819, 820-21 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2003)
(finding stop justified where officer followed vehicle for seven blocks while, running a check on
the license and registration, and consequently learned that registration had expired and license
plate was registered to a different car).
447. See People v. Heather, 815 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004) (holding warrant
check of passenger improper), appeal denied, 2005 WML 182893 (Ill. Jan. 26, 2005); Roberts, 813
N.E.2d at 753 (finding warrant check of passenger improper); People v. Torres, 807 N.E.2d 654,
666 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (pronouncing warrant check of defendant improper after police
witnessed him arguing with a woman in a parked car), appeal denied, 823 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. 2004),
and cert. denied sub nom. Illinois v. Torres, 125 S. Ct. 1603 (2005).
448. People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 204 (I11. 2003), vacated sub nom. Illinois v.
Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
449. Id. at 204-05. See also People v. Gilbert, 808 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
2004) (holding that presence in a high-drug activity area alone does not create reasonable
suspicion to conduct a canine sniff).
450. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205.
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stop is never required to justify a sniff for narcotics with any suspicion
whatsoever. 45 ' A motorist stopped for failing to wear a seat belt or for
driving with a burned-out registration light is subject to a canine sniff,
even without any indication that the car contains illegal substances.
Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, the Court's decision
clears the way for officers to use the dogs in many other situations. 52
For example, officers could walk trained dogs along parked cars or cars
waiting at a stoplight, and a dog's positive response would invariably
justify the officers' detention of the motorist to further investigate the
presence of drugs.453 In addition, there is little in the Court's opinion
that would prevent officers from conducting dog sniffs along the
exterior of garages or perhaps even residences.454 Finally, the decision
may authorize dog sniffs of people in a wide variety of public places,
such as schools, courthouses, and bus stations.455
Despite the Court's seemingly broad ruling, however, the use of
canines is not entirely without limits. Perhaps most importantly, the
Court did not reject the outcome in Cox, an opinion that expressed
concern with both the length of the traffic stop and the absence of
suspicion to justify the dog sniff.456 Although the Court did not explore
the facts of that case, it did "assume" that a dog sniff during an
"unlawful detention" would be unconstitutional. 457 This statement thus
retains a significant limitation on officers' use of canines: namely, an
officer who otherwise prolongs a traffic stop may not properly
commence a dog sniff of the car.
With this limitation on police conduct, the implications of Caballes
in Illinois are twofold. First, an officer who travels with a canine unit
may use the canine during any legitimate traffic stop-provided that the
investigation does not unreasonably prolong the stop. Second, where an
officer must wait for a canine unit to arrive at the scene of a traffic stop,
Illinois courts probably will closely scrutinize the circumstances
surrounding the stop. In Cox, the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected a
traffic stop that lasted fifteen minutes before the dog arrived on the
451. Caballes H, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837-38 (2005).
452. Id. at 845-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
453. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
454. In fact, during oral arguments before the Court, the State argued that it would be proper
to walk a trained dog around a house in search of illegal drugs. Tr. of Oral Argument, Illinois v.
Caballes, No. 03-923, 2004 WL 2663949, at *10 (Nov. 10, 2004).
455. See Caballes H, 125 S. Ct. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (worrying that under the
Court's decision, "canine drug sniffs [may be] entirely exempt from Fourth Amendment
inspection," regardless of the context).
456. Id. at 837 (citing People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (I11. 2002)).
457. Id.
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assumption that the officer was stalling at the scene of the stop.458
Therefore, future defendants can still look to Cox when challenging
evidence obtained from dog sniffs. When viewed in the context of the
restrictive approach taken by the Supreme Court of Illinois in cases like
Brownlee and Harris, Illinois courts can be expected to similarly
suppress evidence obtained as a result of intrusive police conduct.45 9
D. Tightening the Reins of Police in Traffic Stops
While not directly expressed, language in the Supreme Court of
Illinois' recent opinions involving traffic stops suggests the court's
strong concerns with the investigative techniques police have used
while making routine stops. For example, in Cox, the court implied that
the officer stalled at the scene while waiting for the canine unit to
arrive. 460  Also, in Brownlee, the court took issue with the unjustified
detention leading up to what the State unsuccessfully argued was a
consensual search. 46 1 These statements demonstrate that the court will
no longer permit "fishing expeditions" during routine traffic stops.
462
Previously, if a police officer wanted to know the contents of a
person's car, he had a number of investigative techniques from which to
choose in order to accomplish his goal. A police officer could follow a
458. People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 280 (I11. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Illinois v. Cox, 539
U.S. 937 (2003).
459. It also should be noted that Caballes 11 does not preclude an evidentiary challenge to the
use of trained narcotics dogs. The reliability of the dogs' alerts, though not a factor in the
Supreme Court of Illinois' decision, weighed heavily in Justice Souter's dissent. Caballes 11, 125
S. Ct. at 839 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stressing that "[t]he infallible dog ... is a legal fiction"
before discussing the problems with using dogs as investigatory tools). In future cases,
defendants could be expected to challenge the reliability of a dog's findings. See, e.g., People v.
Canulli, 792 N.E.2d 438, 445 (I11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003) (holding that evidence of the use of
laser technology to measure automobile speed required a hearing to determine the admissibility of
the results).
460. Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 280 ("We have examined the record and find that it is devoid of
circumstances which would justify the length of the detention.... Officer McCormick should
have issued a traffic citation or warning ticket to defendant expeditiously. Had he done so,
defendant would have left the scene of the traffic stop prior to the arrival of the canine unit.").
461. People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 563 (Ill. 1999) ("Certainly Robinette does not stand
for the proposition that, following the conclusion of a lawful traffic stop, officers may detain a
vehicle without reasonable suspicion of any illegal activity and for any amount of time, so long as
they ultimately request and obtain permission to search the car.").
462. Professor Maclin, criticizing judicial treatment of such fishing expeditions, stated:
The typical 'You don't have any guns or drugs in you car?' inquiry, which is
immediately followed by the 'You won't mind, then, if I search your car?' inquiry, are
not based upon a reasonable belief that contraband is inside a vehicle. Instead, this
routine is part of a carefully scripted practice designed to exploit the vulnerable status
of a motorist enmeshed in a police seizure.
Maclin, The Decline, supra note 53, at 187.
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car until the driver committed a traffic violation, as in Brownlee, and
then use his show of authority to gain consent to search the car.463 If the
driver did not consent, the motorist suffered detainment anyway, while
the officer waited for a canine unit to arrive. 464 Dog sniffs, because they
did not require suspicion to justify, were a powerful and often-used tool
of law enforcement.465  Thus, no matter what the motorist did, the
officer could observe the contents of the car and thereby pressure the
motorist to agree to a search; motorists found themselves ensnared in a
Catch-22 situation.
The recent Supreme Court of Illinois decisions effectively stop all of
these coercive techniques. As the court stated in Cox, the officer
"should have issued a traffic citation or warning ticket to defendant
expeditiously., 466 This statement seems the ultimate standard set by the
court for law enforcement officials in recent decisions. The court
permits requests for identification or engaging in dialogue reasonably
related to the traffic stop, as long as such requests or questions do not
improperly prolong the stop. However, once the officer has issued a
citation or warning, any further questioning or investigation will likely
require the support of reasonable and articulable suspicion.
In essence, all of the decisions comprise a thorough explication of
Terry's scope inquiry. In Gonzalez, the court expressly held that the
Terry scope requirement restricted both the length and manner of the
investigatory stop.467 The court, in that case, also developed a multi-part
test that it has applied to virtually all aspects of a stop.46' Under the
final prong of the test, a court considers whether the officer's conduct
improperly prolongs or fundamentally alters the nature of the stop.4 6 9
The first part of this prong mirrors the court's previous decisions in
Brownlee and Gherna, where the court found the continued detention of
the defendants exceeded the proper scope of a Terry stop. 470 Thus, the
Supreme Court of Illinois' examination of prolonged detentions
preceded the development of the Gonzalez test. The court illustrated the
463. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d at 559 (noting that one officer stated he would stop the
defendant's vehicle if the driver committed a traffic violation).
464. See Vazquez, supra note 99, at 231 (describing officers' ability to detain unconsenting
motorists).
465. Harris, supra note 66, at 572 n.116.
466. People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ill. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Illinois v. Cox, 539
U.S. 937 (2003).
467. People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 269 (I11. 2003).
468. Id. at 270.
469. Id.
470. People v. Gherna, 784 N.E.2d 799, 811 (111. 2003); People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556,
566 (Ill. 1999).
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second part of the third prong in Harris, in which it ruled that the
officer's warrant check of the defendant changed the fundamental
nature of the stop into an investigation of prior wrongdoing.471
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Caballes did not
overturn these landmark Illinois cases. As the Court explained, dog
sniffs are sui generis and, therefore, their use is not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment.472 Moreover, Caballes did not affect the Illinois
courts' propensity to closely examine the circumstances of traffic stops
and apply narrow limits to the scope of Terry stops. The Gonzalez test
remains intact, meaning an officer may not unreasonably prolong or
otherwise alter the fundamental nature of a traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion.473 In fact, as one recent appellate court noted, this
scrutiny of traffic stops extends into credibility determinations:
The open use of traffic laws as a sheer pretense in order to fulfill an
ambition to detain someone, and in order to conduct a warrantless
search during that detention, is a factor to be weighed when testimony
diverges over how events unfolded and led to an inevitable search of
the motor vehicle. In weighing factual disputes over what happens
after an obvious pretextual traffic stop, trial judges should be mindful
of the officers' true purpose in making the stop, when they consider
inconsistencies over the length of the detention and disputes over the
events that led to the ultimate search.
474
In short, Illinois police officers who engage in broad investigations
into criminal activity during routine traffic stops now do so at the
serious risk that their evidence will be suppressed as the result of a
Fourth Amendment violation.
V. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' APPROACHES TO TRAFFIC STOP CASES
Illinois is not the only state seeking to determine the proper
constitutional bounds of police conduct during traffic stops. A number
of other states have relied on their state constitutions or a more
expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment to reach decisions that
protect motorists from intrusive investigative techniques. This Section
will give examples of how other states have approached the same issues
that Illinois courts have faced.
471. People v. Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219, 228 (Ill. 2003), vacated sub. nom. Illinois v. Harris,
125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005).
472. Caballes 11, 125 S. Ct. 834, 847 (2005).
473. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 269-70.
474. People v. Lomas, 812 N.E.2d 39, 44 (11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2004).
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A. New Federalism
In response to the United States Supreme Court's narrowing of a
number of constitutional rights, including the Fourth Amendment
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, a number of state
courts have begun to interpret their state constitutions in a way that
offers greater protection of a citizen's rights. 4 Indeed, in the past
thirty years, many state supreme courts have departed from the United
States Supreme Court's analysis and developed a body of state
constitutional law, leading to a legal development known as New
Federalism.476
While the Brownlee line of cases are not specifically based on an
interpretation of the Illinois Constitution, an undercurrent of New
Federalism can be seen in these cases.477 For instance, before issuing its
decision in Brownlee, the Supreme Court of Illinois remanded the case
to the appellate court with instructions to consider arguments based on
the Illinois Constitution.478 When the court issued its final opinion in
475. BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 (1991). While the
federal Constitution provides a "floor" for enforcement of constitutional rights, state courts are
free to raise the "ceiling" of these rights through independent interpretations of their state
constitutions. Id. at 4.
476. G. Alan Tarr, The Future of State Supreme Courts as an Institution in the Law: The New
Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1997). In fact, many
state courts examine constitutional questions under their state constitutions before looking to the
federal Constitution for answers. Id.; see also Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory
and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 178 (1984) ("My own view has long been that a state court
always is responsible for the law of its state before deciding whether the state falls short of a
national standard, so that no federal issue is properly reached when the state's law protects the
claimed right.").
Perhaps the leading advocate of New Federalism was United States Supreme Court Justice
William J. Brennan, who argued that "the Court's contraction of federal rights and remedies on
grounds of federalism should be interpreted as a plain invitation to state courts to step into the
breach." William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986). On the
other hand, critics of New Federalism have argued that the emerging practice is result-oriented
and amounts to improper state court activism. See Michael D. Weiss & Mark W. Bennett, New
Federalism and State Court Activism, 24 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 229, 259 (1994) (describing
New Federalism's critics' view that state courts have acted improperly by relying on a result-
oriented theory). In addition, one scholar has noted the fragmentation between legal systems
resulting from New Federalism and the potentially adverse consequences in the area of criminal
procedure. Ronald K. L. Collins, The Once "New Judicial Federalism" and its Critics, 64 WASH.
L. REV. 5, 6 (1989).
477. For an argument that Illinois courts should re-examine their reluctance to rely on the
Illinois Constitution to strengthen Fourth Amendment protections, see Professor O'Neill's article
in this issue. Timothy P. O'Neill, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 895 (2005).
478. People v. Brownlee, 678 N.E.2d 1048, 1048-49 (11. 1997). On remand, the Appellate
Court of Illinois applied the lockstep doctrine and decided the case under Robinette. People v.
Brownlee, 687 N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1997) (discussing Ohio v. Robinette,
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Brownlee, Justice James Heiple's concurring opinion urged the court to
explicitly base its holding upon the Illinois Constitution to protect it
from federal review.4 9 In addition, the court's independent reasoning
and decreasing reliance on United States Supreme Court case law are
facts that indicate New Federalist principles. 480 Furthermore, in Cox,
the Appellate Court of Illinois had expressly ruled that its decision was
required by article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. When the
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment, it
was unusually vague on the constitutional basis of its decision. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the complete absence of any discussion
of the lockstep doctrine in these cases may suggest that the justices are
purposely avoiding the issue to prevent overruling it or distinguishing
the current cases from earlier ones.482
519 U.S. 33 (1996)).
Although the appellate court ruled against Brownlee, its opinion left open the possibility that
the Supreme Court of Illinois could make the opposite ruling based on a policy decision. In fact,
the court's language practically invited the Supreme Court to do so:
In view of the ever-increasing instances of claimed consents to search given by drivers
in circumstances like those present here, we understand why the trial court, the
Supreme Court of Ohio, and other courts have thought that requiring an officer to tell
the detained driver that he is free to go before the officer may ask consent to search his
vehicle might be appropriate to further important fourth amendment protections. We
repeat, however, that the policy judgment underlying the imposition of such a
requirement should be made either by the Illinois legislature or our supreme court.
Id. at 1179 (emphasis added).
479. People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 566-67 (I11. 1999) (Heiple, J., concurring). Under
Michigan v. Long, the United States Supreme Court placed the burden on state courts to clearly
indicate when a decision is based on independent state constitutional grounds. Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
480. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 97 (2000).
481. People v. Cox, 739 N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2000).
482. See People v. Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219, 223-36 (I11. 2002) (failing to refer to the lockstep
doctrine in invalidating a warrant check on a defendant-passenger), vacated sub. nom. Illinois v.
Harris, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005); People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 279 (I11. 2002) (including only a
passing reference to the lockstep doctrine in decision holding the dog-sniff test impermissible),
cert. denied sub nom. Illinois v. Cox, 539 U.S. 937 (2003). The opinions of Justice Freeman in
Harris and Cox, for instance, are more sweeping and demonstrate a lesser regard for federal
precedent. See Harris, 802 N.E.2d at 223-36 (relying on the Supreme Court of Illinois' Gonzalez
test to invalidate a warrant check); Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 280-81 (ignoring, for example, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Place). On the other hand, the opinion of
Justice Fitzgerald in Gonzalez as well as Chief Justice McMorrow's opinion in Gherna are
somewhat less sweeping and give relatively greater consideration to United States Supreme Court
authority. See People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 268-69 (111. 2003) (citing to a number of
federal cases in upholding officer's request for identification from passenger); People v. Ghera,
784 N.E.2d 799, 805-12 (Ill. 2002) (acknowledging the Supreme Court's autonomy when
deciding that the officers were justified in conducting an investigatory stop of the defendant).
Thus, Justice Freeman and Chief Justice McMorrow may represent opposing sides in a New
Federalism debate among the usual four-member court majority. Compare Harris, 802 N.E.2d at
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Unlike the vague approach taken by the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Brownlee and its progeny, some states have restricted police authority
during traffic stops and have clearly expressed their reliance, in similar
cases, on state constitutional grounds. 483  It is widely understood that
reliance on state constitutional grounds provides broader protection for
individual citizens against the grand, and often intrusive, powers of law
enforcement.484 For example, in State v. Carty,485 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey relied solely on the New Jersey Constitution 486 in ruling that
law enforcement officers are required to have a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot before asking for consent to search an
individual's automobile after a valid traffic stop.487  In affirming the
appellate court's grant of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the reasonable suspicion
standard, hailing from its state constitution, serves "the prophylactic
purpose of preventing the police from turning routine traffic stops into a
fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the lawful stop. ' 488
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court, in People v. Haley,489
announced that article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution490
223-36 (looking to end heavy reliance on Illinois state law), and Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 280-81
(ignoring great deference to Illinois decisions as opposed to the United States Supreme Court
decision), with Gherna, 784 N.E.2d at 805-12 (citing the United States Supreme Court precedent
in the court's reasoning).
483. See Tarr, supra note 476, at 1098 (discussing the manner in which state supreme courts
began to rely on their state constitution).
484. LATZER, supra note 475, at 4. See State v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202, 204 (Wash. 2004) ("It is
well settled that article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection to
individual privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution" (quoting
State v. Jones, 45 P.3d 1062 (Wash. 2002))).
485. State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903 (N.J. 2002).
486. Specifically, the court looked to article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution,
which provides for protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and in cases of consent
searches has been interpreted to mean that "any consent given by an individual to a police officer
to conduct a warrantless search must be given knowingly and voluntarily." Carty, 790 A.2d at
907 (citing State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) (rejecting the federal standard enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973))). See
N.J. CONST. art. 1, par. 7 (discussing searches and seizures in a provision similar to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution).
487. Carry, 790 A.2d at 905. The driver was stopped for speeding in a rental car, for which
the driver could not produce proper identification and registration. Id. at 905. The failure to
produce identification combined with what appeared to be nervous behavior by both the driver
and defendant-passenger aroused the officer's suspicions, ultimately leading to the driver signing
a consent form to search the vehicle, which revealed nothing, and pat-down searches of both
revealing cocaine on defendant's person. Id. at 905-06.
488. Id. at 905.
489. People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666 (Colo. 2001).
490. The Colorado Constitution provides that "[tihe people shall be secure in the persons,
papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
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provided much broader protection for the rights of its motorists than the
constitution.49' In this case, three defendants sought protection from law
enforcement officers who pulled the driver over for following the car in
front of it too closely.492  After reviewing the appropriate license and
registration, the officer did not write a citation or ticket for the traffic
violation and told them they were free to go. 49' Nevertheless, the
officer summoned narcotics-trained canines to sniff around the car
ultimately alerting them to contraband.494  In rejecting the State's
argument that this case falls under the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in United States v. Place,495 the court explicitly distinguished
airport and bus496 searches of luggage from automobile searches.
Colorado's highest court concluded that "a dog sniff search of a
person's automobile in connection with a traffic stop that is prolonged
beyond its purpose to a drug investigation intrudes upon a reasonable
expectation of privacy requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity . 497
In June 2004, the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Rankin,498
garnered sweeping support from its state constitution in two
consolidated cases where an officer stopped a car for a minor traffic
violation.499 In Rankin, the officer in each case requested identification
491. Haley, 41 P.3d at 671. The court cites to a number of Colorado Supreme Court cases that
similarly found the state constitution's protections are broader than the federal Constitution's
protections under the Fourth Amendment. Id. But see People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351,
1358-59 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) ("Our law concerning searches and seizures is extensively
developed. With respect to the issues raised by this case we view the Colorado and United States
Constitutions as co-extensive and therefore follow federal precedent as well as our own.").
492. Haley, 41 P.3d at 669.
493. Id. at 669-70.
494. Id.
495. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding a dog-sniff of luggage while
defendant was detained at an airport is not a search subjected to traditional Fourth Amendment
limitations because an individual does not have a heightened expectation of privacy in the odors
emanating from his luggage).
496. The court referred to People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986 (Colo. 2001), a case decided on
Fourth Amendment grounds, where a canine-sniff was employed on a Greyhound bus traveling
across state lines. See Haley, 41 P.3d at 671-72 (discussing searches at airports and buses and
addressing Fourth Amendment issues in these instances).
497. Haley, 41 P.3d at 672.
498. State v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202 (Wash. 2004); see also State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 846
A.2d 1198, 1202 (N.H. 2004) (looking to the New Hampshire Constitution and People v.
Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260 (Ill. 2003), in finding reasonable suspicion where the motorist
immediately exited his car upon being stopped by police, because the motorist's conduct implied
that he did not want the officer to see the inside of his car).
499. James Rankin was the passenger in one of the consolidated cases, in which the driver was
stopped for "roll[ing] over a marked stop line." Rankin, 92 P.3d at 203. Kevin Staab was a
passenger in the second case where the driver was pulled over for failure to have a license plate
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of the passenger' °° without any reason to believe they were engaging in
criminal behavior.01  The court ruled that article I, section 7502 of the
Washington Constitution prohibits such police conduct because it
invaded the "private affairs" of a vehicle's passengers. °3 Indeed, the
court concluded that the officers exceeded their authority in "seizing"
passenger identification "for the sole purpose of conducting a criminal
investigation" without a reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminality' °n
Moreover, the court made it starkly clear that although law enforcement
officers may have a conversation with passengers, they may not,
without violating the state constitution, turn the encounter into an
501investigation without a reason for such an invasion of their privacy.
As these cases illustrate, some states deem an independent analysis of
state constitutional issues necessary to strike a balance between
individual rights and police authority. Federalism principles permit a
state court to rely on its state constitutional protections afforded their
citizens in order to insulate their citizens' rights from potentially
abusive state law enforcement authorities. This is particularly effective
in the context of traffic stops where the United States Supreme Court
has been reticent to seriously consider fundamental freedoms. More
importantly, basing decisions on state constitutional grounds may help
protect them from federal review.
B. An Examination of Aggressive Police Conduct Nationwide
There are a considerable number of jurisdictions, unlike Illinois, that
do not seem to insist on a reasonable suspicion in order to engage in
police action not directly related to the traffic stop, including the use of
canines, conducting warrant checks, and otherwise prolonging the
vehicle occupants' detention.0 6  On the other hand, there are a
light. Id. at 204.
500. Id. at 203-04.
501. Id. at 207.
502. The Washington Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
503. Rankin, 92 P.3d at 207.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. See, e.g., United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding reasonable
suspicion unnecessary for officer's questions about travel plans and request to run computer
check on license and registration because it was within the scope of lawful traffic stop for
tailgating); United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that dog sniff of car's
exterior was not a search and that reasonable suspicion was not required to conduct a brief scan
for drugs at end of traffic stop for following car ahead too closely); United States v. Childs, 277
F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining that officer's questioning of motorist about drugs during
valid traffic stop for cracked front windshield was not a seizure and did not require reasonable
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significant number of jurisdictions that, in one way or another, agree
with the Illinois approach that reasonable suspicion is required before
police may prolong or alter the nature of the stop. In many of these
cases, the individual facts in each case play the most important role in
ascertaining reasonable suspicion and, as such, the legality of police
conduct.507  The following discussion focuses on a variety of
jurisdictions that appear sympathetic to the necessity for reasonable
suspicion when a police inquiry exceeds the initial basis for a traffic
stop.
508
1. Consensual Encounters, Searches, and Continued Detentions
Many courts have considered a number of cases requiring evaluation
of the validity of a routine traffic stop turned into an investigatory stop
for criminality. 5°9 Drug interdiction techniques are commonplace and
have been employed in response to the government's "war on drugs"
since the early 1980s."u Brownlee is illustrative of the typical dialogue
that can occur between an officer and a motorist during a routine traffic
stop turned consensual search.51 ' The consent to search approach taken
by law enforcement to justify searches of detained motorists for past
criminality erases the critical protections afforded by the Fourth
suspicion); State v. De La Rosa, 657 N.W.2d 683 (S.D. 2003) (pronouncing that the simultaneous
presence of drug dog during detention of motorist for failing to use left turn signal did not require
reasonable suspicion of criminality); State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762 (Tenn. 2000) (ruling
"canine sweep around the perimeter of a legally detained vehicle does not constitute a search and
thus need not be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion" as long as stop is not
prolonged by unreasonable delay).
507. For instance, in Brownlee, although the facts appeared to mirror those in Robinette, the
Supreme Court of Illinois was able to carve out a factual distinction that supported greater
protections for the defendant-passenger because there was no reasonable suspicion to justify his
continued detention. See also infra Part III.A. I (exploring the Brownlee decision).
508. In fact, some suggest that individual rights have taken a back seat to unfettered police
authority on the balancing scale. One justice sitting on the Supreme Court of South Dakota noted
in his dissent in State v. Kenyon, 651 N.W.2d 269, 277-78 (2002) (Amundson, J., dissenting): "It
appears as though citizens no longer possess any constitutional rights the moment they seat
themselves in their vehicles and start down the public roads and highways. Today, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence simply encompasses too many buzzwords, which have swallowed the
protections created by our forefathers." Id.
509. See Whorf, supra note 29, at 41-52 (discussing states that have placed restrictions on
police authority to broaden the scope of a routine traffic stop into an investigation for drugs).
510. See id. at 5 (asserting that police officers do not actually stop motorists for traffic
violations, but to further the war on drugs and, consequently, detain a vast majority of drivers that
are innocent beyond the traffic violation).
511. See People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ill. 1999) (detailing the officer's inquiry
to search for more alcohol after failing to issue a citation before obtaining the defendant's
consent); see also Whorf, supra note 29, at 2-3 (outlining the typical sequence of events during a
traffic stop turned consensual search).
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Amendment.5! 1 2 As previously discussed, consensual searches hinge on
whether the defendant consented "freely and voluntarily. ' '5 3 Therefore,
the Mendenhall "free to leave" test, based on a totality of the
circumstances test, is used to determine the volition of a motorist's
consent.514
In one case, State v. Green,515 the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled
that the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle after a
routine traffic stop for speeding.516  After the officer issued a traffic
ticket and returned the defendant's license and registration-and thus,
after the completion of the stop-the officer then told the defendant he
was "free to go." '517 However, the officer continued the questioning,
asking the defendant whether he had guns or contraband in his car, to
which the defendant replied, "No. ,51" The officer subsequently asked
for consent to search the defendant's person and car and the defendant
replied, "Sure. Go ahead," which consequently led the officer to
discover cocaine and marijuana and to radio for a back-up officer out of
concern for his safety.1 9
In deciding whether the officer's conduct was proper, the court
looked to its decision in Ferris v. State,52° which set out a laundry list of
factors that would aid in the determination of whether the police-citizen
encounter was consensual.521  The court applied the factors to the
512. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the United States Supreme Court case law concerning
searches and concluding that a police officer does not have to inform a citizen that he has the
right to refuse consent and can freely leave).
513. See supra Part II.A.3 (outlining the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
consensual searches, such as the holding in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that consent must merely
be given freely and voluntarily).
514. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (presenting the facts of the Mendenhall
case, outlining the examples the Justice Stewart gave in determining if a reasonable person would
believe that he was free to leave, and concluding that the proper question is if a person feels free
to decline an officer's requests).
515. State v. Green, 826 A.2d 486 (Md. 2003).
516. Id. at 501.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 489-90. The officer testified that he was concerned for his safety "especially
because of the 'area,' 'it was extremely dark out'," and the defendant was larger in size than he
was "with a 'history of violence with hand guns."' Id. at 490.
520. Ferris v. State, 735 A.2d 491 (Md. 1999).
521. Id. at 496. The factors listed by the court include:
[T]he time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they
were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or
isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was
free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime,
whether the police retained the person's documents, and whether the police exhibited
threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that
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circumstances in the case and interpreted the officer's behavior while
questioning the defendant as non-threatening because he "asked" rather
than "ordered," and while awaiting a second officer as back-up the
officer and the defendant engaged in "casual conversation" where the
officer explained the reason for the delay.522 Based on these factors, the
court concluded that a "reasonable person in [the defendant's] position
would have felt free to terminate the encounter and decline [the
officer's] request to search his car.' 523  As a result, the defendant's
encounter with the officer was not a seizure subject to the Fourth
Amendment and the defendant voluntarily consented based on the
totality of circumstances. 524
In State v. McKinnon-Andrews,5 25 decided by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, the defendant was pulled over for failing to make a stop
at a stop sign.526 The defendant pulled into a restricted area near a
hospital parking lot and exited his car to approach the officer, who,
suspicious about such behavior, told the defendant to return to his car. 2 7
After the defendant produced his New Hampshire driver's license, the
officer ran a check and discovered that the defendant's car was
registered in Rhode Island; the defendant explained he had borrowed
the car from a friend and that he was headed to the New Hampshire
Department of Corrections to pay restitution.5 28 The officer noted that
the defendant had taken an uncommon route, and then asked the
defendant if there was anything in the car he should know about, to
which the defendant replied, "What, like drugs? No, you want to
check?'5 29 The search produced a cigar box containing a scale and
measuring spoon covered in cocaine powder.530
The New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted the test used in
Gonzalez by the Supreme Court of Illinois and found that the officer's
questioning regarding the contents of the defendant's car was not
related to the initial purpose for the stop under the first Gonzalez
he or she was not free to leave.
Id. at 502.
522. Green, 826 A.2d at 499.
523. Id. at 501.
524. Id. The court later added that defendant's fifteen to twenty minute detention between his
consent and the search of his car did not invalidate defendant's consent. Id. at 503.
525. State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 846 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 2004).
526. Id. at 1200.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
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inquiry.5 ' However, applying the second prong of the Gonzalez test,
the court found the officer's questioning supported by a reasonable
suspicion, specifically, the officer inferred that the defendant initially
got out of his car because the "[defendant] was concerned about the
officer viewing the car's contents. ' 32 The court ultimately held that the
officer's conduct did not violate the New Hampshire or Federal
Constitution.533
Some courts view continued detentions in the context of routine
traffic stops appropriate when the initial basis for the stop is complete
and further inquiry or investigation is supported by a reasonable
suspicion of criminality.534 Also, when a motorist is pulled over for an
ordinary traffic violation, courts generally hold that the defendant's
refusal to consent to a search cannot provide the basis for reasonable
suspicion.535
For example, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, in State v.
Williams,536 held that an officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion
of criminality when he detained a vehicle occupant beyond the purpose
of the traffic stop, a possible insurance violation.537 The court first
determined that the driver and the defendant-passenger were not free to
leave when an officer told them, "[B]efore you leave, let me ask you a
few questions. 538 In addition, the court considered the coercive nature
531. Id. at 1203.
532. Id. at 1203-05.
533. Id. at 1204-05. The court noted that reasonable suspicion could be based on behavior
that is either "guilty [or] innocent" on its face. Id.
534. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz, 161 F. Supp. 2d 627 (D. Md. 2001) (holding
that the officer had authority to issue the seat belt violation that prompted the stop, but could not
ignore that violation simply to conduct an investigation of unlawful possession without
individualized support); State v. Williams, 571 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming trial
court's decision to grant motion to suppress because the officer's actions after the completion of a
traffic stop violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when the officer did not have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to support continued detention).
535. See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
officer's decision to detain the defendant and call a drug dog was impermissibly based on the
defendant's refusal to give the officer consent to search his car); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d
942 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant's refusal to consent to search his car could not be
considered as a suspicion when it was the only event that occurred after the traffic stop).
536. State v. Williams, 571 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 2002).
537. Id. at 710. In Williams, the driver provided the officer with his driver's license, which
revealed a previously suspended license for drug possession, and he got out of car as requested by
officer. Id. at 705-06. While the driver was being questioned, the officer radioed for a K-9 patrol
unit. Id. at 706. Upon the unit's arrival, a second officer asked the defendant-passenger
questions, receiving answers that were inconsistent with the driver's previous answers to the same
questions. Id. at 706. The officers then obtained oral consent to search the contents of defendant-
passenger's suitcase located in the trunk of the car, which led to the discovery of marijuana. Id.
538. Id. at 709.
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of the encounter, 539 to support the fact that the defendant was
"sufficiently intimidate[ed]" by the circumstances to demonstrate his
freedom to leave was restricted.54 °  Concluding that the encounter
constituted a seizure, the court found the officer's discovery that the
defendant's driver's license had previously been suspended for a drug-
related offense "was in no way probative of a present crime, and thus
could not serve as the basis for a reasonable suspicion. 54'
In State v. Kenyon, 542 however, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
held that the continued detention of the defendant until the arrival of
narcotics-trained canines after a routine traffic stop for a broken rear
brake light arose from a reasonable suspicion.543 In that case, the court
noted that the defendant appeared visibly nervous, was sweating and
slurring his speech, and appeared to be under the influence of a
stimulant.544 Also, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the
detention had been prolonged because it lasted twenty-five minutes.545
In Massachusetts, determining the permissible scope of a routine
traffic stop turns on proportionality.546  This means that the "level of
intrusiveness of the police conduct" must correlate proportionally to the
539. The court considered "the presence of two uniformed patrol officers in marked, flashing
vehicles, one of them part of a K-9 unit," that the detention of the driver and defendant-passenger
lasted between twenty-five and forty minutes, the officer's testimony that such encounters
typically last between nine and eleven minutes, the forced questioning of each separately while
the drug dog stood next to the driver, "and the seemingly innocuous but immediate transition
from the valid traffic stop such that [the driver] and [defendant] may not have realized the initial
seizure had ended." Id.
540. Id.
541. ld.at7lO.
542. State v. Kenyon, 651 N.W.2d 269 (S.D. 2002). See also United States v. Lebrun, 261
F.3d 731, 732-34 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding continued detention while awaiting narcotics-trained
dog sniff of rental car stopped for "routine traffic stop" was lawful because driver and passengers
all appeared "exceptionally nervous" and increasingly so as officer's questioning of all occupants
about travel plans continued, they all gave "vague and confused answers" to the questions, which
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that they were transporting narcotics).
543. Kenyon, 651 N.W.2d at 274-75.
544. Id. at 274.
545. Id. at 275; cf United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz, 161 F. Supp. 2d 627, 633-34 (D. Md.
2001) (determining that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he questioned defendant
about the contents of his car because the questioning exceeded the scope of the initial basis for
the stop, namely, that the front passenger was not wearing his seatbelt; officer had no
individualized suspicion based on nervousness, and conflicting stories as to who consented to a
search of the vehicle).
546. See generally Commonwealth v. Sinforoso, 749 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Mass. 2001) (finding
reasonable suspicion that narcotics or other contraband were located in a "hidden compartment"
in the car where an officer had observed a switch, which the officer believed commonly operated
secret compartments for hiding drugs in cars).
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officer's reasonable suspicion.5 47  For instance, in Commonwealth v.
Sinforoso,54' a decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
an officer stopped a motorist for speeding through a red light.549 In that
case, the officer had observed weapons on the floor of the vehicle,
noticed a "switch" that led to a hidden compartment concealing
narcotics and found the driver's and passenger's inconsistent responses
to the same questions suspicious. 50 The court found that the officer had
acted in a manner "proportional to the escalating suspicion that emerged
over the course of the stop.
55
'
2. Warrant Checks
Law enforcement officers routinely conduct warrant checks in
conjunction with traffic stops. 52  Although the Supreme Court of
Illinois in Harris extended the Gonzalez three-step inquiry to limit this
police practice of conducting warrant checks during ordinary traffic
stops, not all courts agree with the outcome in Illinois.553 For example,
in State v. Miller,554 a case decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
the driver of a rental car was stopped for unlawfully crossing over the
right-hand fog line of the road, whereupon the officer immediately
requested the driver's license and rental agreement.555  The officer's
computer check revealed that the name of the primary driver on the
rental agreement was the driver's "cousin," whom the officer learned
had been arrested for possessing a large amount of marijuana.556 The
court ruled the computer check permissible because the officer's
conduct stemmed from reasonable suspicion. Also, the officer's
questioning did not prolong the detention because it was reasonably
547. Id. at 132 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 661 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Mass. 1996)).
548. Sinforoso, 749 N.E.2d 128.
549. Id. at 131.
550. Id. at 131-33.
551. Id. at 132-33.
552. See LAFAVE, supra note 14 § 9.2(f) n.153 (citing a substantial number of cases when a
law enforcement officer kept a person pulled over to determine if he was wanted by the police).
553. See id. (citing various cases that take approaches different than the Supreme Court of
Illinois).
554. State v. Miller, 798 So. 2d 947 (La. 2001) (per curiam).
555. Id. at 948.
556. Id. at 949. The cousin had been arrested for possession of 50 to 2000 pounds of
marijuana. Id.
557. Id. at 948, 950. Although the officer did not notice any criminal activity afoot, the driver
appeared extremely nervous, was trembling, and told the officer that she had been driving from
Atlanta to Houston for business while popping caffeine pills to stay awake, which amounted to
reasonable suspicion to detain for computer check. Id. Consequently, backup and a drug dog
were called after she refused to allow the officer to search her car. Id. at 949.
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related to the officer's suspicions and "although not brief, [it] did not
transform the encounter into a defacto arrest." '58
In United States v. Simmons,559 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit addressed the validity of a warrant check. The
court considered the propriety of the length of a police officer's
continued detention of a driver after a stop for running a stop sign in a
car with tinted windows.56° After obtaining his license and registration,
the officer called for a drug dog when the defendant refused to consent
to a search of his car; the subsequent dog sniff alerted the police to
cocaine and guns.56" ' The officer then ran a computer check for
outstanding warrants.562 The check revealed that although the defendant
had a valid license and registration, a man with the same first and last
name and physical description of the defendant, but different birth date
and geographic location of residence, was wanted for writing a bad
check.5 63 The court reversed the district court's ruling that the detention
was unconstitutionally prolonged "beyond the time it normally takes to
write a traffic citation. ' 56  Instead, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the seventeen to twenty-six minute detention following the stop did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because the discrepancies between the
defendant and the description in the arrest warrant sufficiently raised the
level of reasonable suspicion.565
Courts frequently find valid warrant checks where the officer
conducting the traffic stop has reason to believe the vehicle might be
566
stolen. However, in an analogous federal case, the court reproved an
558. Id. at 950-51. The court considered the fact that while awaiting the arrival of a drug dog,
the "physical intrusiveness of respondent's detention did not intensify as the duration of the stop
expanded to accommodate the trooper's growing suspicions of criminal activity." Id. at 950.
559. United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775 (11 th Cir. 1999).
560. Id. at 776.
561. Id. at 776-77.
562. Id. at 777. The officers repeatedly called the dispatcher to send a canine unit because
they had initially been informed that canines were not available until a certain time of day. Id. at
776-77.
563. Id. at 777.
564. Id. at 777, 780. The district court considered the results of the warrant check "ambiguous
information" that did not support reasonable suspicion. Id. at 777-78.
565. Id. at 778-80. The discrepancies were not "fatal" to the "articulable suspicion" that the
warrant might be for the defendant. Id. at 779.
566. See, e.g., United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508 (5th Cir. 2004) (determining
check of license and registration for outstanding warrants was appropriate because officer had
reasonable suspicion to believe car could have been stolen when after stopping defendant-driver
of rental car for tailgating, lease documents revealed name of a fifty-year-old female as lessee and
none of the vehicle occupants resembled a 50-year-old woman); State v. Reynolds, 890 P.2d
1315, 1320 (N.M. 1995) (holding warrant check of pickup truck driver stopped for individuals
dangerously hanging their feet over the tailgate too close to the road, was proper where the
2005]
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officer for conducting an unwarranted criminal history check.567 In
2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that
an officer's criminal history check while detaining a motorist after a
stop for a possibly expired vehicle registration sticker and tinted
windows constituted an unreasonable seizure.5 68  Acknowledging the
valid registration sticker, the officer told the defendant that he still had
to check the legality of the level of tinting on the windows. 569  The
officer then ran a criminal history check through his computer while
determining that the window tint complied with relevant law. 570  The
results of the computer check revealed that the defendant had a history
of prior felony and misdemeanor convictions.57'
The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress because
it found that law enforcement officers may detain a motorist for five to
fifteen minutes and may ask questions unrelated to the initial purpose of
the stop, despite the prohibition of unrelated questioning under Terry.572
Under Royer, the Fifth Circuit found that once the officer's suspicions
had been "verified or dispelled, the detention must end," or else the
officer must have a reasonable suspicion to press on. Indeed, the
court concluded that the officer exceeded the scope of the stop when he
conducted the criminal history check after determining the validity of
the registration sticker but before checking the legality of the tinted
windows because he had no reasonable suspicion to conduct the history
defendant failed to produce any identifying documentation for the vehicle and the check revealed
the truck had been stolen).
567. See United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding no evidence to
support the police officer's claim of reasonable suspicion that would permit a criminal history
check and further detention). But see United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding criminal history check proper but recognizing that such a check often "take[s] longer to
process than the usual license and warrant requests"); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528,
1536 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding criminal history check reasonable police conduct because it
occurred at the same time as the computer check of defendant's license and registration).
568. Valdez, 267 F.3d at 398.
569. Id. at 396.
570. Id. At this point, while still awaiting the results of the criminal history check, the officer
asked defendant if he had any weapons, to which defendant replied he had a loaded gun in the
passenger seat and a rifle in the trunk. Id.
571. Id. at 396-97.
572. Id. at 397. The district court cited United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.
1993), which "'guaranteed' officers a five to fifteen minute window" for traffic stop detentions.
Id. In evaluating the propriety of the police conduct here, the Fifth Circuit also looked to Terry
for guidance, applying Terry's two-pronged scope inquiry. Id. at 397-98. Terry asks: (1)
whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the search or seizure
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Id. at
398 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968))
573. Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
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3. Questioning Passengers
Vehicle passengers enjoy a greater expectation of privacy than a
driver in the case of ordinary traffic infractions. In Commonwealth v.
Torres,575 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, an
officer discovered several plastic "baggies" of cocaine after searching a
vehicle stopped for speeding.576 After questioning the driver, the officer
looked to the defendant-passenger, who at that point stood at the rear of
the automobile, and hand-gestured a request for his wallet, which the
defendant produced.577 Inside the wallet, along with the defendant's
valid driver's license, the officer noticed what appeared to be drug
transactions noted on slips of paper.57' Based on these suspicions, the
officer then directed his attention back to the driver, still sitting inside
the car, and asked if there were drugs in the car, to which the driver
replied, "No, there's no drugs, search. 579 In reviewing the search, the
court acknowledged the well-settled law in Massachusetts that "a police
inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the production of a valid
license and registration" absent individualized suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing.580  Recognizing that the police inquiry in this case
exceeded the initial purpose for the stop when the officer decided to
question the defendant-passenger, the court concluded that the officer's
suspicions had been dispelled once he learned the identity of the
defendant-passenger and validity of the driver's license and
registration.581' Therefore, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion
to question the defendant-passenger.582
574. Id. See also United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that, although
the initial stop was legitimate, the officers went beyond the scope of the stop by detaining the
motorist after the computer check was completed).
575. Commonwealth v. Torres, 674 N.E.2d 638 (Mass. 1997).
576. Id. at 639-40. When the officer approached the passenger side of the car and knocked on
the window to get defendant-passenger's attention, defendant immediately got out of the car. Id.
at 640. The officer became suspicious and inquired why defendant was getting out of the car, to
which defendant, with some hesitation, informed the officer he did not speak English. Id.
577. Id. Despite learning that the driver's license and registration were valid, the officer's
suspicions were aroused when he discovered that the driver lived in a neighborhood known for
drug activity, and was born in a Latin American source country for cocaine. Id.
578. Id.at640-41.
579. Id. at 641. The officer also discovered, after a pat-down search of his person, that the
driver possessed a beeper, which driver stated was a gift from a friend since he could not afford it
due to being unemployed. Id.
580. Id. at 642.
581. Id. at 641-43.
582. Id.
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583In another case, State v. Affsprung, a New Mexico Court of
Appeals found the defendant-passenger's encounter with police during a
routine traffic stop for a license plate light that did not function properly
was not consensual.5 4  The officer requested identification from the
driver and the defendant-passenger, claiming that it was his customary
practice to do so for safety purposes.8 5 He then conducted a "wants and
warrants check" on their identification, which led the officer to discover
that the defendant had a warrant issued for his arrest.586 In applying
Mendenhall's "free to leave" test here, the court, much like the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Gonzalez, Bunch, and Brownlee, did not distinguish
between detentions of drivers and passengers during ordinary traffic
stops.187 The court rejected the State's contention that "a passenger, as
opposed to a driver, is stopped merely by virtue of being in the vehicle
and is therefore not detained in a manner that would invoke the Fourth
Amendment., 58 8  The court observed that Mendenhall and Delgado
dealt with a federal drug investigation at an airport and a "factory
survey," respectively, and stressed that the encounter in this case "was
the everyday, ordinary occurrence of a motorist stop for a traffic
violation. 5 89 The court viewed the request for passenger identification
as "part of the officer's ongoing investigatory detention."'5 90 According
to the court, what affects the driver similarly affects the passenger
because "a reasonable passenger would [not] feel free to leave the area
[or to] refuse the officer's request for identification., 59  Thus, the
officer's pre-trial testimony that the driver and the defendant-passenger
could not freely leave implied that they had no choice but to consent to
the officer's requests for identification.592
583. State v. Affsprung, 87 P.3d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
584. Id. at 1090, 1094.
585. Id. At the motion to suppress hearing, the officer testified that safety was his primary
concern in requesting defendant-passenger's identification along with the driver's identification
"because '[y]ou have to identify who you're dealing with' ... 'things can occur for any little
reason."' Id. at 1040. The officer also admitted that as he wrote the traffic citation "neither the
driver nor defendant was free to leave." Id.
586. Id.
587. See id. at 1091-92 (finding continued detention of both drivers and passengers to
constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment which requires reasonable and articulable
suspicion to be permitted to continue).
588. Id. at 1091.
589. Id. at 1093 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) and INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)).
590. Id.
591. Id. Quite logically, the court attributed this to the fact that an officer would not "likely
tolerate a passenger's refusal to give the information followed by the passenger leaving the area."
Id. at 1094.
592. Id.
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The court concluded that the encounter here was indeed not
consensual, noting that the officer's asserted safety concern as the basis
for the investigation was not enough to conclude otherwise."'
Moreover, the court characterized the stop as an unlawful investigative
detention insufficiently supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing to justify the continued detention beyond the reason for the
stop.594  Finally, the court aptly concluded that "[t]o permit law
enforcement officers to ask for and to check out passenger identification
under these circumstances opens a door to the type of indiscriminate,
oppressive, fearsome, authoritarian practices and tactics of those in
power that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit."'5 95
As the foregoing discussion of cases from other states indicates,
many jurisdictions have embraced legal approaches to curb aggressive
police action during a routine traffic stop. Some of these states have
specifically required reasonable suspicion for the officer to expand the
scope of the investigation. More importantly, though, many of these
courts have demonstrated a willingness to closely examine the facts
without distorting them to uphold the police conduct. Without defying
United States Supreme Court authority, these courts have managed to
breathe life once again into the Fourth Amendment and protect
motorists in their jurisdictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
A number of commentators and judges have become concerned with
the increasing ability of law enforcement officials to convert a routine
traffic stop into a broad investigation into drugs, rocket launchers, lawn
equipment, or any topic an officer desires. While the United States
Supreme Court has largely limited its review to relatively narrow issues,
such as a motorist's knowledge of his right to refuse a consensual
search or, more recently, whether a dog sniff must be justified by
reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court of Illinois has re-examined
traffic stops using the basic standards governing investigatory stops
embodied in Terry v. Ohio. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Illinois
has restricted the scope of traffic stops to the initial purpose of the stop.
Thus, even though the United States Supreme Court has reversed the
Supreme Court of Illinois' decision in Caballes, it ruled on the narrow
issue presented to the Court. This leaves intact other Illinois decisions
that have effectively eliminated most consensual searches, unfettered
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id. at 1095.
20051
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questioning, and warrant checks on passengers, as well as the decisions
of other states that have begun to chip away at similar law enforcement
conduct during routine traffic stops.
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